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The traditional system of radio spectrum allocation has inefficiently restricted wireless 
services.  Alternatively, liberal licenses ceding de facto spectrum ownership rights 
yield incentives for operators to maximize airwave value.  These authorizations have 
been widely used for mobile services in the U.S. and internationally, leading to the 
development of highly productive services and waves of innovation in technology, 
applications and business models.  Serious challenges to the efficacy of such a 
spectrum regime have arisen, however.  Seeing the widespread adoption of such 
devices as cordless phones and wi-fi radios using bands set aside for unlicensed use, 
some scholars and policy makers posit that spectrum sharing technologies have 
become cheap and easy to deploy, mitigating airwave scarcity and, therefore, the 
utility of exclusive rights.  This paper evaluates such claims technically and 
economically.  We demonstrate that spectrum scarcity is alive and well.  Costly 
conflicts over airwave use not only continue, but have intensified with scientific 
advances  that dramatically improve the functionality of wireless devices and so 
increase demand for spectrum access.  Exclusive ownership rights help direct 
spectrum inputs to where they deliver the highest social gains, making exclusive 
property rules relatively more socially valuable.  Liberal licenses efficiently 
accommodate rival business models (including those commonly associated with 
unlicensed spectrum allocations) while mitigating the constraints levied on spectrum 
use by regulators imposing restrictions in traditional licenses or via use rules and 
technology standards in unlicensed spectrum allocations. 
 
JEL Classification: H23, K11, K23, L14, L51, L96, O3, P48 
 
Key Words: radio spectrum allocation; wireless licenses; unlicensed spectrum; 
property rights; mobile telecommunications policy; “spectrum commons” 
                                                 
1 Professor of Law & Economics and Director, Information Economy Project, George Mason University.  Prof. Hazlett 
received his Ph.D. (Economics) from the University of California, Los Angeles, formerly held faculty positions at the 
University of California, Davis, Columbia University, and the Wharton School, and served as Chief Economist of the 
Federal Communications Commission.  He is the co-author of PUBLIC POLICY TOWARDS CABLE TELEVISION (MIT, 1997). 
2 Partner, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C.  Mr. Leo received his J.D. from The George 
Washington University.  The authors express their appreciation to Charles Jackson for helpful technical comments, and 





I.  INTRODUCTION 
A great information policy debate rages.  While the world marvels at the emergence of vast 
wireless networks, now serving nearly five billion global subscribers,
3 many leading policy advocates 
in the United States have concluded that ceding to mobile networks de facto ownership of the 
airwaves through cellular licenses is a barrier to innovation and social progress.  Latching on to the 
examples of cordless phones, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth, they credit unlicensed bandwidth – spectrum 
without exclusive ownership rights – as a Petri dish for disruptive technologies.  These advocates 
extrapolate these examples as a template for restructuring the airwaves.  Exclusive spectrum rights 
are obsolete, they claim; expanding “spectrum commons” would be more economically productive.  
Federal regulators have begun accepting this argument, shifting policies to favor allocations of 
unlicensed spectrum.   
This Article evaluates the economic and technical arguments underlying this choice of 
regulatory regimes.  It first traces the path from traditional licenses, which systematically squandered 
valuable wireless opportunities, to reforms creating liberal licenses.  Next, we examine the claim that 
advanced wireless technologies can effectively eliminate spectrum scarcity and, with it, the social 
utility of exclusionary rules for access to airwaves. 
We show that interference between radio signals is real and that conflicts between rival users 
are expensive.  To productively use spectrum inputs for one set of applications or technologies 
constrains what such inputs can supply for alternatives.  New and improved spectrum-sharing 
technologies do not eliminate these trade-offs, but instead increase the value of communications and 
further exacerbate the competition for airspace. Overwhelming marketplace evidence demonstrates 
that liberal licenses promote beneficial social coordination, uniquely shifting spectrum to innovative 
uses, organizing investment in large-scale network infrastructure, and creating complex contracts 
permitting intensive spectrum sharing.  Indeed, exclusive frequency rights are so broadly 
accommodating that they efficiently supply “spectrum commons,” just as public parks are most 
productively provided within the context of private ownership of real estate.     
II.  RIVAL SPECTRUM MODELS 
The U.S. mobile phone industry has achieved remarkable success.  More than 270 million 
Americans – roughly 87 percent of the population – purchase wireless service.
4  The nation’s wireless 
carriers spend over $20 billion a year building network infrastructure; about $16 billion more is spent 
on handsets and other wireless devices.  U.S. companies like Qualcomm and Motorola have 
developed leading-edge wireless technologies sold throughout the world.  Firms like Apple, Palm, 
                                                 
3   Gary Kim, Five Billion Mobile Subscribers by End of 2010: What Role for Fixed Networks? TMCNET (Feb. 25, 2010); 
http://4g-wirelessevolution.tmcnet.com/broadband-stimulus/topics/fixed-networks/articles/76859-five-billion-mobile-
subscribers-end-2010-what-role.htm.  
4 Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association, Wireless Quick Facts (data as of Dec. 2008) (“CTIA Wireless 
Facts”), http://www.ctia.org/media/industry_info/index.cfm/AID/10323.  The term “wireless service” is used 
interchangeably with “mobile service,” “cellular service,” and “CMRS” (Commercial Mobile Radio Service, the FCC’s 




and Research in Motion (Blackberry) have amassed leading positions as device and application 
suppliers without owning wireless infrastructure, by contracting with carriers who do. Application 
providers such as Yahoo!, Google, Twitter, and ESPN, while also lacking wireless assets, have 
likewise been able to reach mass market audiences through partnership with wireless firms.  The U.S. 
wireless industry as a whole generates more than $148 billion in revenues per year
5 – more than 
broadcast and cable television combined.
6  According to some estimates, the industry creates more 
than $150 billion per year in additional consumer benefits.
7 
Radio spectrum is a key input to the wireless industry.  Licenses issued by the Federal 
Communications Commission enable firms to exercise control over designated airwaves; the nature 
of the spectrum rights granted affects the volume, quality, cost, and scope of services that can be 
provided to customers.  Through 2008, mobile networks could access only about 194 MHz,
8 just  7 
percent of the prime bandwidth below 3 GHz.  (This is range most economically viable for 
broadcasting and mobile services, and is considered “beachfront property.”)   In September 2006, 
Advanced Wireless Service (AWS) licenses representing an additional 90 MHz of frequency space in 
the 1.7 GHz and 2.1 GHz bands were auctioned, the U.S. Treasury collecting $13.7 billion.
9  These 
frequencies were encumbered by a wide range of government users, were not generally available to 
licensees through 2008,
10 and are gradually being deployed since.
11  In March 2008, the FCC 
                                                 
5   See CTIA Wireless Facts (annualized incremental capital investment $20.1B in 2008).  
6  Compare  CTIA Wireless Facts with IBISWorld Industry Report, Television Broadcasting: U.S. Industry Report, 
http://www.ibisworld.com/industry/retail.aspx?indid=1261&chid=1 (IDISWorld estimates that television broadcasting 
revenue totaled $36.8 billion in 2008), and National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Industry Data, 
http://www.ncta.com/Statistics.aspx (Kagan Research estimates cable revenue totaled $86.3 billion in 2008). 
 
7 Jerry A. Hausman, Cellular, 3G, Broadband and WiFi, in R. Cooper and G. Madden, eds., Frontiers of Broadband, 
Electronic and Mobile Commerce (Physica-Verlag, 2004), 9-25.  See also Roger Etner, Cellular Telecommunications & 
Internet Association (CTIA), The Increasingly Important Impact of Wireless Broadband Technology and Services On The 
U.S. Economy : A Follow Up To The 2005 Ovum Report On The Impact Of The US Wireless Telecom Industry On The US 
Economy, at 2 (2008), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Final_OvumEconomicImpact_Report_5_21_08.pdf. (estimating that by 
2016 the wireless industry will help bring about $427 billion per year in productivity gains, more than the productivity 
gain currently provided by the motor vehicle and pharmaceutical industries combined).   
8  Rysavy Research, Mobile Broadband and Spectrum Demand,  http://www.rysavy.com (Dec. 2008), p. 23 (Rysavy, 
Spectrum Demand).  For a detailed description of mobile (and other) allocations under 3 GHz, see Evan Kwerel & John 
Williams, A Proposal for a Rapid Transition to Market Allocation of Spectrum, Federal Communications Commission 
OPP Working Paper No. 38 (Nov. 2002) (Kwerel & Williams, Big Bang). 
9   Federal Communications Commission Press Release, Auction of Advanced Wireless Service Licenses Licenses Closes 
(Sept. 20, 2006).  Due to regulatory lags, AWS bandwidth was not generally available to licenses until well into 2007 or 
even 2008.  There is also a lag between the time licenses are assigned and networks are built.  T-Mobile, the largest AWS 
bidder, first began serving customers using these frequencies in May 2008.  See Katherine Noyes, T-Mobile’s 3G Network 
Touches Down in NYC, TECHNEWSWORLD   (May 5, 2008); 
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/62876.html?wlc=1235087208. 
10
  Rysavy, Spectrum Demand, p. 23. 
11  Comments of T-Mobile USA, Inc. to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, In the Matter of Relocation of Federal Systems in the 1710-1755 Frequency Band, Review of 
the Initial Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act, Docket No. 0906231085-91085-01 (Aug. 21, 
2009); http://www.ntia.doc.gov/comments/2009/CSEA/T-Mobile_CSEA_NOI_Comments_8-21-09.pdf.  




conducted further auctions for the use of 52 MHz in the 700 MHz band, collecting another $19.6 
billion in winning bids.
12  The 700 MHz frequencies were occupied, in part, by analog TV broadcast 
stations which were switched off June 12, 2009 as part of the transition to digital television.
13  These 
frequencies are largely being held for deployment in emerging “4G” (Fourth Generation) wireless 
services offering far higher data speeds and capacities than existing wireless broadband networks.
14  
The recent FCC sales of new wireless licenses will bring the total amount of licensed 
spectrum available to mobile carriers in the U.S. up to levels comparable to those in the European 
Union.  By 2001, EU regulators had issued mobile licenses allocating an average of about 266 MHz 
per country, about 50 percent higher than the amount then allocated in the U.S.
15  The recent AWS 
and 700 MHz auctions bring the U.S. total up to about 360 MHz available for mobile service,
16 but  
EU countries are now preparing to make major new allocations that will extend the leap-frogging.
17  
                                                 
12  Federal Communications Commission Press Release, Statement by FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin (Mar. 18, 2008). 
13  In 1997 the FCC assigned each TV station a new digital TV broadcasting license, placing the digital stations on 
channels 2-51 so as to allow the remaining channels assigned to TV broadcasting (52-69) to be later reallocated.  By 
regulatory mandate, stations were broadcasting in digital formats on their new digital channel assignments by 2002.  The 
end of analog broadcasting on TV Channels 52-69 had been mandated by Congress to occur Dec. 31, 2006, but contained 
conditions unlikely to be met in the vast majority of markets.  Long delays were anticipated. Hence, in the Digital 
Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005 Congress set Feb. 17, 2009 as the new analog switch-off date.  Just days before 
the deadline, however, Congress, responding to a request from the new Obama Administration, voted to delay the switch-
off until June 12, 2009.  This deadline held.  Ending analog TV broadcasting on channels 52-69 made 108 MHz (6 MHz 
per channel) available for reallocation.  Some 70 MHz of this “digital dividend” was allocated to liberal licenses 
auctioned by the FCC in 2002, 2003 and 2008. 
14  Gary Kim, 4G Wireless Evolution - Verizon Promises 5 Mbps to 12 Mbps LTE Speeds,  TMCNET  (Dec. 7, 2009); 
http://4g-wirelessevolution.tmcnet.com/topics/4g-wirelessevolution/articles/70469-verizon-promises-5-mbps-12-mbps-
lte-speeds.htm.  
15   Thomas W. Hazlett and Roberto E. Muñoz, Spectrum Allocation in Latin America: An Economic Analysis, 21 INFO 
ECON & POL’Y 261 (June 2009). 
16 See Blair Levin et al., Stifel Nicoloas, What 700 MHz Winners Can Do with Their Spectrum, at 4 (Apr. 15, 2008).  
These totals do not include spectrum to “fixed” broadband services, such as the 3.5 GHz band in Europe, and the 2.5 GHz 
band in the U.S.  While these wireless services are being adapted for mobile use, the migration – undoubtedly promising 
as a future source of competition – is yet nascent.  Clearwire is developing a nationwide wireless broadband network 
using WiMax technology delivered over 2.5 GHz frequencies.  There is potentially some 190 MHz available for use there, 
divided between EBS (Educational Broadband Services) licensed held by non-profit (mostly educational) institutions and 
BRS (Broadband Radio Service) licenses held by commercial operators.  Transaction costs associated with re-aggregating 
the dispersed, truncated, and conflicting transmission rights have been formidable.  See Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum 
Tragedies, 22 YALE  J  REG 242 (Summer 2005) (“Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies”).  As of year-end 2008, Clearwire 
reported about 400,000 U.S. subscribers, while cellular carriers accounted for over 25 million high-speed access 
subscribers.  Clearwire Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2008 Results, Clearwire website (Mar. 7, 2009); 
http://newsroom.clearwire.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=214419&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1263228&highlight= .     F e d e r a l  
Communications Commission, High-Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of December 31, 2008, Industry 
Analysis and Technology Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, (Feb. 2010), p. 9; 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296239A1.pdf.  
17   “Ofcom, the regulator in United Kingdom, is in the process of reallocating 355 MHz of spectrum for commercial 
wireless services, which would bring the U.K.’s total up to 710 MHz… Similarly, in Germany, 340 MHz of spectrum has 
been identified for reallocation, which will bring the total up to 645 MHz…”  Comments of CTIA-The Wireless 
Association submitted to the Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of In the Matter of Implementation of 
Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, WT Docket No. 09-66 (Sept. 30, 2009), pp. 82-3. 




To meet the perceived U.S. deficit, the FCC has announced that it “recommends making 500 
megahertz of spectrum newly available for broadband by 2020, with a benchmark of making 300 
megahertz available by 2015.”
18  The goal is ambitious; previous experience suggests that even much 
smaller allocations take much longer to implement.
19   
 
Cellular licenses were issued in the U.S. between 1982 and 1989, PCS licenses beginning in 
1995.
20  These latter awards represented a paradigm shift in the authorization of spectrum use, 
rejecting the traditional regime crafted for and typified by broadcasting licenses.   For radio and 
television stations, licensees receive narrowly crafted operating permits that define the service they 
can provide, the technology they may employ, the physical location where they must place 
transmitters (and transmitter height), and the business model (advertising-based, non-subscription) 
they must use.  A TV broadcaster cannot, for example, forego video transmissions and instead use its 
licensed spectrum to provide high-speed internet service.   
Wireless phone licenses – and particularly PCS licenses – were the first major implementation 
of two fundamental policy innovations: (1) awarding licenses by competitive bidding, abandoning 
assignments by regulatory fiat or lottery
21; and (2) permitting licensees wide discretion in using 
allotted frequency space.
22  Auctions were efficiency-enhancing,
23 but the latter policy was of much 
greater significance for consumer welfare.
24  With licensees free to choose services, technologies, 
architectures, and business models, market forces could for the first time optimize radio spectrum use.  
The emergence of vigorous economic activity, including high levels of network investment, led 
regulators to adopt liberal licenses as the new standard for wireless services.   
In parallel to the evolution of the liberal license model, a second distinct FCC policy regime also 
was developing.  Traditionally, the FCC set aside bands for “unlicensed” use by low power, short-range 
radios – remote controls, short-range security systems, and baby monitors, for example.  Such 
                                                 
18   Federal Communications Commission, National Broadband Plan: Connecting America (Mar. 16, 2010), p. 26; 
http://www.broadband.gov/download-plan/.  
19   Spectrum for cellular telephone service was first formally sought when the FCC opened a rule making on the matter in 
1968.  Licenses, two per market, were finally assigned by lottery in the 1983-89 period.  These licenses were allocated 25 
MHz each (50 MHz total).  PCS spectrum was first requested at the FCC in 1989.  Auctions assigned the first licenses in 
1995 but, with many fits and starts, completed in 2005.  Total spectrum allocated to the PCS licenses was 120 MHz. 
20   Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Right to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 
Years? 41 J LAW & ECON 133 (Oct. 1998) (“Hazlett, 67 Years”).  Note that while the U.S. was the first country to widely 
assign cellular licenses (for analog voice services), EU countries issued 2G (Second Generation) licenses (for digital voice 
services) in 1989-1992.  This was years ahead of the comparable U.S. allocation, for PCS. 
21   License auctions were first authorized in Section 6002 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.  The first 
spectrum auctions were for PCS awards.  Lotteries had been used to assign cellular licenses.  See James B. Murray, Jr., 
Wireless Nation (2001). 
22   For example, cellular licenses were originally issued with a mandate that operators use a specific analog transmission 
format (AMPS); there was no mandated format for digital PCS licenses.  
23  Peter Cramton, Spectrum Auctions, S. Majumdar, et al., eds., Handbook of Telecommunications Economics (North 
Holland, 2002) (“Spectrum Auctions”). 
24   See Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Muñoz, A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum Allocation Policies, 40 RAND 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS  424 (Autumn 2009). 




unlicensed bands have also been allocated for the use of non-communications devices, like 
microwave ovens and medical or scientific equipment that emit radiation potentially conflicting with 
the use of communications systems.  The first unlicensed bands were established in 1938.
25 
In 1985, however, the FCC took a decisive step in authorizing a whole class of new 
unlicensed devices, eliminating the process of regulatory pre-approval under vague “public interest” 
criteria.  This deregulatory initiative, which began under President Jimmy Carter’s FCC and was 
implemented under President Ronald Reagan’s, aimed to reduce barriers to entry for new 
technologies.
26  In place of a case-by-case regulatory process, the FCC set forth technical criteria, 
including power limits, to which new “Part 15” unlicensed devices would need to adhere.
27  This 
policy paved the way for widespread use of unlicensed devices in the so-called Industrial, Scientific 
and Medical (ISM) frequencies in the 900 MHz (26 MHz), 2.4 GHz (83.5 MHz) bands, and 5.8 GHz  
(125 MHz).  In subsequent years, thousands of unlicensed devices were introduced under the Part 15 
framework, including cordless phones and WiFi radios connecting computers in local area 
networks.
28  One of the lead FCC engineers that worked on the regulatory initiative recounts that such 
devices were neither planned nor anticipated.
29 
In recent years, the FCC has moved aggressively to allocate more bandwidth to unlicensed (or 
“license-exempt”) spectrum.
30  In 1985, there was 234.5 MHz of spectrum (in the ISM bands) 
                                                 
25 See Kenneth R. Carter, Ahmed Lahjouji & Neal McNeil, FCC, Unlicensed and Unshackled:  A Joint OSP-OET White 
Paper on Unlicensed Devices and Their Regulatory Issues, OSP Working Paper No. 39 at 6 (May 2003).  Amateur bands 
(including CB “citizens’ band” frequencies) are organized on a similar basis to unlicensed bands, although radio operators 
are technically required to be licensed by the FCC.  The requirement is loosely enforced.  Moreover, licenses help to 
assure that users comply with FCC rules, and do not cede control of spectrum space.  In this sense, unlicensed (amateur) 
bands have been in use since before the 1927 Radio Act.   
26   See Michael J. Marcus, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth - The Path from Carter and Reagan-era Faith in Deregulation to 
Widespread Products Impacting Our World, 5 INFO 19 (August 2009);  Kenneth R. Carter, Unlicensed to Kill: A Brief 
History of the FCC Part 15 Rules, 5 INFO 8 (August 2009); Kevin Negus & Al Petrick, History of Wireless Local Area 
Networks (WLANs) in the Unlicensed Bands, 5 INFO 35 (August 2009). 
27   See 47 C.F.R. § 15 et seq. In addition to the limiting technical constraints, Part 15 requires that an operator accept 
whatever interference is received and correct whatever interference is caused.  Should harmful interference occur, the 
operator is required immediately to correct the interference problem, even if correction of the problem requires ceasing 
operation of the Part 15 system causing the interference.  See In the Matter of Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s 
Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Systems, First Report and Order, ET Docket 98-153, ¶ 6 n.2 (rel. April 
22, 2002). 
28   Devices are regulated under three methods at the FCC:  Verification, Declaration of Conformity, and Certification.  
The latter category relies largely on tests performed by private firms.  See FCC Office of Engineering and Technology; 
http://www.fcc.gov/oet/ea/procedures.html#sec1.  
29   “In the 1981-85 period when these rules were drafted, wireless LANs were not a common topic of discussion.  Indeed, 
Ethernet and other LAN installations were rare outside technical organizations and unheard of in homes.  The 
deliberations had raised the possibility of ‘wireless data terminals’ as an example, but did not specifically “’tilt’ in favor 
of this application in the resulting rules.  The Carter and Reagan era faith in deregulation laid the foundation for the future 
development of a variety of products without the need for government action.”  Marcus, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, at 29-30. 
30    The rationale for this policy shift was laid out in the FCC’s Spectrum Policy Task Force Report issued in Nov. 2002, 
and was strongly endorsed by then FCC Chair Michael Powell, appointed by Pres. George W. Bush.  See Spectrum Policy 
Task Force, FCC, Report, E.T. Docket No. 02-135 (Nov. 2002); see also Lawrence Lessig, Technology Over Ideology, 
12.12 WIRED (Dec. 2004); http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.12/view.html?pg=5 (“When Powell took charge, most 




available to unlicensed devices.
31  By 2004, approximately 665 MHz of spectrum in the same 
frequency range had been allocated to unlicensed use.  In comparison, as of that same date, about 385 
MHz had been allocated in this range to liberal licenses – an unlicensed-to-licensed ratio of 1.7.
32  
This tends to be substantially higher than in other countries, where the ratio is generally less than one.  
See Figure 1. 
The U.S. government push favoring unlicensed bandwidth was further seen in an important 
2005 decision.  Regulators allocated 50 MHz (3650 to 3700 MHz) for terrestrial services including 
WiMax an emergent wireless broadband technology often referred to as “wi-fi on steroids.”
33  
Despite the general use of neighboring frequencies (known generically as “the 3.5 GHz band”) in 
international markets as licensed spectrum, and the development of WiMax radios using these 
airwaves by equipment makers, the FCC chose to allocate the entire band for unlicensed (non-
exclusive) access.
34  This generated controversy even among the major vendors of radios for use in 
unlicensed spectrum, Intel and Alvarion, which had opposed the FCC’s approach.
35  Then, in a much 
larger and more valuable band where the Commission sought to choose between licensed and 
unlicensed models, the FCC ruled in December 2008 that the frequencies previously used by analog 
television broadcasts would be set-aside for the use of unlicensed devices.  This decision set aside an 
estimated 240 MHz of UHF bandwidth in the median U.S. market,
36 and brings the total unlicensed 
allocation to 955 MHz.
37  By comparison, as of year-end 2008, approximately 422 MHz had been 
                                                                                                                                                                     
that markets allocate land most efficiently.  But Powell's FCC quickly sabotaged this idea… Auctions were slowed; 
spectrum commons were encouraged.”). 
31   In 2002, the requirement that devices using ISM bands conform to spread spectrum formats was abolished, while 
power limits and other technical constraints were retained.  Amendment of Part 15 of the Commission's Rules Regarding 
Spread Spectrum Devices, Second Report and Order, ET Docket No. 99-231 (Rel. May 30, 2002). 
32 See also Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies at Table 2 (comparing 648.5 MHz of unlicensed spectrum to 189 MHz of 
“flexible use,” licensed spectrum). 
33   George Ou, How to Waste Perfectly Good Mobile Spectrum, DIGITAL  SOCIETY (March 16, 2010);   
http://www.digitalsociety.org/2010/03/white-space-backhauls-a-penny-wise-and-a-pound-foolish/.  
34   Wireless Operations in the 3650-3700 MHz Band, First Report and Order (ET Docket No. 04-151 (Rel. March 16, 
2005). 
35   See Jerry Brito, The Spectrum Commons in Theory and Practice, 2007 STAN  TECH  L  R 1; 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/brito-commons.pdf 
36 Under FCC rules, unlicensed devices will be permitted to access TV band spectrum not occupied by television 
broadcasters.  The average TV market features 8.6 TV stations (there are 1800 full-power stations and 210 TV markets), 
and each market is allocated 49 TV channels allocated 6 MHz each (294 MHz total).  This leaves about 240 MHz for 
unlicensed use.  We note that the bandwidth that would actually be for available for unlicensed devices is much below the 
240 MHz set aside.  See Michael Calabrese, Broadcast to Broadband, IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING (March/April 2008); 
http://www.newamerica.net/files/Broadcast_to_Broadband.pdf.  That is because the FCC usage restrictions, ostensibly 
employed to protect over-the-air television viewers on the one side and unlicensed device users on the other, leave many 
unused channels in place to separate rival applications.  Moreover, transactions to move TV stations to alternative 
channels or platforms (cable, satellite, and broadband) so as to efficiently resolve conflicts are impossible to execute given 
the lack of band ownership under the non-exclusive usage rights issued by the FCC. 
37   This total includes 26 MHz in the 900 MHz band; 83.5 MHz in the 2.4 GHz band; 50 MHz in the 3.6 GHz band; 555 




allocated to liberal licenses, bringing the ratio of unlicensed to liberal-license spectrum to about 
2.3:1.
38  
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43 and other computer manufacturers, together with several academics,
44 has 
                                                 
38 By year-end 2008, some 422 MHz of spectrum was allocated for liberal licenses, although much of it was encumbered.  
In particular, 700 MHz licenses hosting TV broadcasts ongoing until a scheduled June 2009 analog switch-off.  Licensed 
spectrum allocations are calculated as: 50 MHz (800 MHz cellular), 120 MHz (1.9 GHz PCS), 14 MHz (SMR, 1.9 GHz), 
90 MHz (1.7/2.1 GHz AWS), 70 MHz (700 MHz), 78 MHz (2.5 GHz,13 6-MHz BRS channels).  The 30 MHz of WCS 
spectrum is not included because, while license rules are liberal in terms of services and technologies, emission rules are 
exceedingly stringent.  The WCS licenses, auctioned in 1997, attracted extremely low bids as a result.  See Cramton, 
Spectrum Auctions.  Ironically, the FCC blocked a 2006 bid by satellite radio licensee XM to buy WCS licenses.  With 
Satellite Digital Audio Radio Service (SDARS) licenses allocated spectrum adjacent to the WCS band, integration of 
ownership could have easily solved the externality problem. Tony Sanders, FCC Delay Scotches WCS Merger, RADIO 
MONITOR (May 22, 2006); http://www.allbusiness.com/services/motion-pictures/4479825-1.html.  On how ownership 
structures impact transaction costs, see Harold Demsetz, Ownership and the Externality Problem, in T.L. Anderson & F. 
S. McChesney, eds. Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict and Law 282 (Princeton Univ. Press; 2003). 
39 See, e.g., P. Pitsch, The Future of Radio Spectrum Policy, Technology@Intel Magazine (Feb./Mar. 2004), 
http://www.intel.com/technology/magazine/standards/st02041.pdf. 
40 See, e.g., Comments of Microsoft Corporation at 2-3, Revision of Parts 2 and 15 of the Commission’s Rules to Permit 
Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure (U-NII) Devices in the 5 GHz Band, ET Docket No. 03-122 (FCC filed 
Sept. 3, 2003). 
41  See, e.g., Comments of Wireless Information Networks Forum, Apple Computer, Inc. Petition for Rulemaking To 
Allocate Spectrum in the 5 GHz Band To Establish a Wireless Component of the National Information Infrastructure, 
RM-8653 (July 10, 1995). 
42  See,  e.g., Cisco Systems, Wireless and Spectrum Management, 
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/gov/networks/wireless_spectrum_management.html. 
43   Stephanie Condon, Google Launches ‘Free the Airwaves,’ CNET  NEWS.COM (Aug. 18, 2008); 




been urging the FCC to expand the unlicensed “spectrum commons.” Advanced low-power radios, 
they argue, can use embedded sensors and digital intelligence to sense each other’s presence and 
avoid interfering with each other’s transmissions.  In the most aggressive form of the argument, all 
carriers and consumers should therefore be allowed to transmit radio signals in any frequency band 
using one of these smart radios.   
With this technology in hand, these advocates claim, exclusive, property-like rights in 
spectrum are obstructive anachronisms.  The FCC should therefore designate more frequency bands as 
unlicensed – i.e., to be used only by FCC-permitted low-power radios.  And the FCC should allow 
anyone to operate low-power transmitters in licensed bands allocated for services provided by 
broadcasters, wireless phone companies, and others, so long as these “underlay” devices operate 
below some power threshold set by the FCC, and incorporate smart protocols to avoid interfering 
with licensed transmissions. 
The FCC has been receptive to this vision.  In 2002, an FCC-convened task force advocated 
further use of unlicensed bands.
45  On the predicate that unlicensed bands have been a “tremendous 
success,”
46 the Commission designated several new bands for unlicensed access.
47  The FCC also 
authorized underlay rights for ultra-wideband (UWB) radios in bands above 10 GHz, provided they 
use very low power to leave other communication signals undisturbed.
48  The FCC further considered 
authorizing unlicensed devices to access licensed spectrum in its Interference Temperature 
proceeding, launched in November 2003; the initiative failed, however, and the proceeding was 
terminated in May 2007.
49  And the 3650 MHz and TV Band “white spaces” proceedings, mentioned 
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above, were clear victories for champions of unlicensed spectrum access, victorious in head-to-head 
match-ups where the Commission considered whether to apply licensed or unlicensed rules for 
specific frequencies. 
 
III.  WIFI, TELEVISION, AND WIDE-AREA WIRELESS 
Much of the case for un-licensing spectrum begins with the argument that broadcast television 
wastes valuable radio spectrum and that an unlicensed regime can make more productive and 
efficient use of the spectrum.
50  For empirical support, commons advocates rely heavily on the 
success of WiFi, which is now widely used in local area networks, public hot spots, and other 
applications  Wi-Fi, as one commons advocate puts it, is “the most prominent unlicensed wireless 
technology available today,” and “a great case study for the impact of dynamic wireless 
technologies.”
51  Introduced in the late 1990s,
52 Wi-Fi radios now provide high-speed, digital 
connections to millions of users using unlicensed bandwidth.  TV broadcasters, by contrast, provide 
video service via exclusive licenses.  But TV band airwaves are dramatically under-utilized, littered 
with “white spaces” where little to no communications travel.  Indeed, all over-the-air TV reception 
could be transferred to cable and/or satellite TV systems at a small fraction of the cost of the TV 
airwaves that would be released for more valuable services.
53  Exclusive spectrum rights, we are to 
conclude, impede innovation and promote inefficient use of the airwaves. 
  Both ends of the comparison are confused.  First, broadcast TV licenses are locked into 
inefficient market structures precisely because of “command and control” regulation that economists 
have long condemned as “Gosplan.”
54  Ronald H. Coase’s classic critique of the FCC focused on 
these licenses, leading him to recommend adoption of private property rights in spectrum to replace 
“public interest” assignments by regulators.
55  Coase’s proposal was considered radical.  When Coase 
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explained his proposal at a 1959 FCC hearing, the first question posed by a Commissioner was, “Is 
this all a big joke?”
56 
  It was not.  Were licensees to freely control the spectrum allocated to their licenses, rather 
than being granted narrow rights to transmit in ways specified by regulators, these de facto property 
owners would naturally seek to expand value creation – to make productive use of “white spaces.”  It 
took a quarter century for regulators to (implicitly) start to embrace Coase’s proposal.  Beginning 
with licensing of cellular phone service in the 1980s, carriers were given far more control over the 
use of their spectrum as compared to radio and TV broadcasting licensees.   
Why the shift?  Well, for one thing, the political interest in regulating cellular was lower 
because the content transmitted over cellular networks is private, whereas broadcasting is inherently 
public, transmitting content influencing social, cultural, and political developments.  For another 
thing, the cost of regulating cellular was much higher.  Instead of a single, one-way transmitter, 
cellular systems involve the integration of literally thousands of base stations and literally millions of 
handsets, each a receiver and a transmitter moving in space.  The increasingly liberal licenses granted 
mobile phone operators have endowed firms with the ability to design their own services, adapt new 
technologies, determine network architectures, and experiment with new business models as profit 
criteria dictate, a radical departure (for allocated spectrum
57) from the traditional broadcast license.   
The historical broadcast license is quite distinct from a liberal license.  Licensees are endowed 
with extremely delimited property rights in spectrum; their specific use permits authorize only a 
broadcasting service operated according to fixed technical standards and pre-specified service 
definitions.  Licensees cannot allocate the spectrum allocated to their licenses to higher valued uses, 
even if alternatives are more profitable.   The gross inefficiencies that result are not due to licensing, 
but to truncating private ownership of spectrum rights.  As Coase recognized, granting licensees 
ownership of spectrum, as in broad, “flexible use” permits,
58  allows market forces to divert spectrum 
resources to their most socially valuable employments.
59 
  On the flip side of the comparison between Wi-Fi and broadcasting, commons advocates 
misread the market evidence on Wi-Fi.  Although highly effective and popular as a method for 
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connecting PCs to broadband networks, fixed, short-range data links are primarily a complement to 
wide area networks (WANs) rather than a substitute (which may eclipse the alternative in the 
marketplace).  Wi-Fi nodes have flourished in enterprises as high-speed fiber connections became 
available; similarly, residential adoptions have soared as cable modem, DSL (digital subscriber line), 
and fiber subscriptions have been extended to U.S. households.  In this context, the driver of demand 
for unlicensed devices is the deployment of the WANs, which rely upon private property rights to 
“spectrum in a tube.”  This causality is more easily seen, perhaps, in the case of cordless phones, an 
appendage of fixed networks.  There, the clarity of the symbiotic economic relationship has generally 
prevented commentators from asserting that plain old telephone service can more efficiently be 
supplied using a “spectrum commons.”  It would be nonsensical to claim that the use of the edge 
device (the cordless handset) was in any way undermining the utility of the ownership rights to the 
fixed network and the bandwidth created by its investors.  
  Unlicensed frequencies are not “open access” regimes that enable users to appropriate 
spectrum resources without constraint.
60  Nor are unlicensed bands organized within a “commons,” 
where collective resource owners set usage rules to maximize joint returns.
61  Group owners do not 
set resource-appropriation terms, government regulators do.  Trade-offs from adopting different rules 
are evaluated on behalf of the public.  Regulation of unlicensed bands creates non-exclusive use 
rights, and the conditions imposed exclude particular types of behavior so as to protect others.  A 
high-powered TV broadcast station is not allowed to blast emissions, diminishing opportunities for 
low-power radios attempting to provide home networking links in the same market.  This is intended 
to limit conflicts between rival users of a scarce resource,
62 rather than risk resource dissipation due 
to unproductive competition for rights.
63 
Property rules are an antidote to “tragedy of the commons.”
64  Where entirely unrestricted 
access prevails and scarcity obtains, the marginal user will crowd into the “free” resource even as the 
cost borne by the group of users exceeds the (new) benefit created.  The standard example is an open 
pasture that becomes “over-grazed” by the owners of cattle, each of whom realizes some gain until 
the resource is destroyed for all.   
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Perhaps because of the compelling manner in which the “over-grazing” problem is 
formulated, it is often missed that the regulation of unlicensed devices – prescriptions on technology 
standards and power limits – is just another approach to avert a tragedy of the commons.  The regime 
seeks to permit some behavior and to block incompatible behavior.  The proper test of social 
efficiency is not whether “interference” has been reduced or eliminated, but whether the most 
valuable outcomes obtain.
65 
Three implications arise.  First, anarchy does not reign.  The power limits and technology 
restrictions imposed by regulators protect some applications and users at the expense of others. 
Scarcity is not eliminated; indeed, the effort to advance what Benkler labels a “well regulated 
commons”
66 is itself a rejection of open access.  Allocating spectrum for unlicensed usage necessarily 
excludes certain wireless alternatives, implicating trade-offs that need not be made in the case of true 
resource abundance.   
Second, tragedy of the commons may obtain even when there is little or no interference 
between users.  Markets that experience over-utilization yield the most widely recognized “tragedy,” 
but rules to mitigate resource dissipation can easily result in under-utilization, which is equally 
inefficient.  Such an outcome includes the instance where investments in technology, infrastructure, 
or economic organization – say, paying incumbents to move their wireless operations – are socially 
efficient but fail to occur due to the lack of spectrum ownership.  Market failure of this sort has 
clearly occurred in unlicensed bands, such as U-PCS, where spectrum allocated for over a decade to 
data transmissions saw not a single device approved for use by the FCC.
67   
Third, even when abundant use is made of unlicensed bands, the allocation may be socially 
destructive.  For example, unlicensed rules may exclude services that are more valuable than the 
protected activities.  Equivalently, the social value created in the use of unlicensed devices may be 
achieved more economically by via exclusive spectrum rights, provided either by market competitors 
or via the acquisition of bandwidth by a non-profit organization supplying a “spectrum park.”  The 
active secondary market in spectrum access vividly demonstrates how device makers can, rather than 
request unlicensed allocations for the use of their radios, contract with mobile licensees exercising de 
facto spectrum ownership.  Apple arranges for its iPhone customers to access radio spectrum via bulk 
contracts it arranges with carriers (in U.S. and internationally).  Amazon sells its Kindle book reader 
with embedded wireless functionality (for digital content downloads) by contracting (in the U.S.) 
with the Sprint phone network.  General Motors operates an emergency OnStar radio service by 
contracting with Verizon Wireless.
68    The market supplies radio spectrum and network services 
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(with infrastructure complementary to frequency spaces) for an extremely wide range of applications, 
rival application providers bidding against each other for available resources.  To the degree that 
spectrum inputs with exclusive ownership rights are made available by regulators, the standard 
economic optimization results. 
 
IV.  WI-FI: THE STARBUCKS FALLACY 
The Wi-Fi standard for wireless, high-speed, local-area networks was ratified in 1999.
69  By 
2002, global annual sales of Wi-Fi equipment had exceeded $1 billion;
70 by 2006, such sales reached 
an estimated $3.8 billion.
71  The secret of Wi-Fi’s success, commons advocates maintain, is that the 
standard defines low-power, spread-spectrum devices that can operate “without the requirement of 
spectrum licensing to prevent interference.”
72  With Wi-Fi, “there is no need for service providers, 
cell towers, controlled hardware markets, or expensive spectrum licenses.”
73 
 
While WiFi was taking off, comparable wireless data services offered in licensed bands were 
allegedly doing “exactly the opposite.”
74  Although wireless phone companies eventually began 
offering high-speed data services, these networks cost ten times more,
75 and “[n]one .  .  .  has yet 
become a mass-market success.”
76  WiFi, it is suggested, is superior even to high-speed wireline 
connections:  there is “great consternation in the communications industry” about the inadequacies of 
DSL and cable modem broadband services, and Wi-Fi service “costs half as much.”
77 
Even putting aside the factual predicates (and premature nature) of these arguments,
78 the 
comparisons are fatally flawed.  First, assuming that unlicensed devices are popular, it does not 
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necessarily follow that more spectrum should be allocated to unlicensed instead of licensed uses.  In 
2008, U.S. Wi-Fi devices and cordless phones were out-sold by well over an order of magnitude by 
digital TV sets, which garnered $27 billion in sales.
79  Yet, the airwaves dedicated to broadcast 
television are severely misallocated because video signals can be delivered more efficiently on 
alternative platforms, freeing the TV band for more productive employments.
80  From a social 
welfare perspective, the relevant policy question is how incremental bandwidth can best create value.  
In evaluating trade-offs, it is important to recognize that licensed regimes can provide precisely the 
same applications as unlicensed spectrum.  Just as public parks are supplied under a private property 
regime for land, public, private non-profit, or private for-profit enterprises can host spectrum sharing 
arrangements.
81  To achieve an efficient outcome, the analysis must determine that the costs of pre-
empting alternative liberal license allocations are less than unlicensed benefits.  No amount of 
economic activity in unlicensed bands itself makes the case for allocating more unlicensed spectrum. 
Second, as an empirical matter, the social value of the economic activity associated with 
liberal licenses far exceeds what has been achieved in unlicensed bands.  Licensed wide area wireless 
networks are used by more than 270 million
82 U.S. subscribers who pay over $148 billion
83 a year 
and generate at least another $150 billion
84 in consumer surplus.  Equipment sales tell a similar story. 
In 2006, global sales for WWANs (wireless wide area networks, using liberal licenses) were about 
$225 billion (including handsets); for WLANs (wireless local area networks, using unlicensed 
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frequencies) about $3.8 billion.
85  By 2012, analysts expect that smartphone revenues will reach $66 
billion.
86  
FCC statistics for broadband access in the United States tell the same story.  While unlicensed 
bandwidth is available everywhere for the use of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and while 
hundreds of WISPs (wireless ISPs) use wireless for this purpose,
87 they operate in small deployments, 
usually in rural areas where low population densities ensure minimal interference.  The result is that 
unlicensed frequencies, while useful in providing Wi- 
Fi as a WLAN appendage in millions of homes or businesses that subscribe to wide area broadband 
services, are virtually non-existent in supplying WAN services themselves.  The FCC recorded only 
700,000 fixed wireless customers as of year-end 2007, a total which includes ISPs using licensed as 
well as unlicensed frequencies, as compared to more than 52 million mobile high-speed data 
customers (all delivered via licensed spectrum).  See Table 1.  In addition, the FCC reported about 71 
million fixed high-speed connections (cable modem, DSL, and fiber), networks relying on the 
ownership of spectrum encased in wires  The bottom line; more than 121 million subscribers receive 
high-speed data service (fixed and mobile) via exclusively owned bandwidth, as against – at most -- 
just a few hundred thousand subscribers to WISPs accessing the “spectrum commons.” 
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  The rise and fall of Municpal Wi-Fi networks is also revealing evidence.  “Muni Wi-
Fi” was widely touted as the next big thing in broadband in 2006 and 2007.
89  At one point, there 
were plans to deploy scores of networks covering such major urban areas such as Philadelphia, 
Houston, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Atlanta and San Francisco.
90 By 2008, however, virtually all 
of these plans had collapsed.
91  Access to “free” airwaves were supposed to provide cheap service, 
but the structure of property rights – with regulatory limitations on power, technology, and the 
inability to exclude (or, therefore, contract with) potentially rivalrous spectrum users – has rendered 
the model of limited practical use.
92  Gradually, this reality has set in.  “Story after story after story 
highlight[s] how wide-area WiFi is a lot more complicated than many in the industry (and the press) 
would have you believe.”
93 
At the end of the day, Wi-Fi offers only very limited substitution possibilities for high-speed 
DSL, cable, fiber, or wide area wireless.  As commons advocates themselves acknowledge, it is “a 
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2005  2006  2007 
           
Dec  Jun   Dec  Jun  Dec 
ADSL  19,515,483 22,584,255 25,412,883 27,561,867   29,451,719  
SDSL  368,782 337,412 344,759 319,987   293,974  
Traditional Wireline  510,191 610,722 685,939 752,009   592,295  
Cable Modem  26,558,206 29,174,494 31,981,705 34,404,368   36,497,284  
Fiber 
3  448,257 685,823 1,035,677 1,403,729   1,850,695  
Satellite  426,928 495,365 571,980 668,803   791,142  
Fixed Wireless  257,431 361,113 484,377 586,813   705,014  
Mobile Wireless  3,127,670 11,016,520 22,287,749 35,305,253   50,977,914  
Power Line and Other  4,571 5,208 4,776 5,420   5,274  
              
   Total Lines  51,217,519 65,270,912 82,809,845 101,008,249   121,165,311  Draft 
  18
short-range technology designed primarily for connections to a nearby hotspot.”
94  Wi-Fi radios 
typically operate at such low power that “[e]ven if every home in a neighborhood had a Wi-Fi access 
point, few of those nodes would see one another. . . ”
95  Wi-Fi devices, in short, rarely interfere with 
each other because they provide such limited range.  The secret of Wi-Fi’s success is the secret of 
WiFi’s failure. By contrast, DSL, cable modems, fiber, and wireless broadband service (e.g., EV-DO) 
provide wide-area coverage across cities and markets, cost-effectively scaling to national and 
international networks. 
Some predict, however, that more and better Wi-Fi lies ahead and that radio-frequency (RF) 
engineering advances will overcome all these limitations.  Such range-extending technology includes 
phased-array antennas, mesh networking boxes that automatically create ad hoc mesh networks with 
each other, a follow-up standard (802.16) for wireless metropolitan-area-network (“MAN”) 
technology, and so forth.
96 
There is no doubt that innovative advances will come, but they will not be restricted to use in 
unlicensed bands.  Rapid technological change is  the networks using licensed spectrum.  Airwaves 
are agnostic to regulatory regimes; investors are not.  Where network owners can optimize a given 
spectrum space, contracting with those who will share it, they are often able to bring more resources 
and greater social coordination to bear.  This is observed in liberal licensed spectrum, which is being 
far more intensely developed and utilized, in economic value terms, than spectrum allocated to 
traditional licenses or unlicensed bands.  As U.S. smart phone sales reach $14 billion per year,
97 
iconic wireless innovations such as the Apple iPhone and RIM Blackberry rely on wide area wireless 
networks, and the licensed spectrum they use, to revolutionize communications.  Hence, as the 
benefits of using unlicensed spectrum rise, the opportunity costs of taking allocations away from 
liberal licenses rise pari passu.   
Which brings us to Starbucks.  When eliminating (through government regulation) all options 
other than low-power radios, exclusive rights in real estate may work similarly to exclusive rights in 
spectrum.  Users can themselves limit the number of transmitters and/or receivers competing for 
access to spectrum in corporate offices, on university campuses, and Starbucks coffee shops.
98  Intel, 
for example, carefully restricts unauthorized use of unlicensed frequencies within its corporate office 
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space.
99  Carnegie Mellon protects the spectrum on its campus by effectively “privatizing the 
commons,” i.e., carefully selecting what services and users to include in its network (and thereby 
which to exclude), while adopting technologies and distributing wireless access points to control 
interference problems.
100  This is not the “end of scarcity,” but the operations of a property system to 
manage competing, mutually exclusive activities.
101  Conflicts still exist, and “open access” would be 
socially destructive.     
 
In short, regulatory exclusions police Starbucks stores airwaves, limit unlicensed freqeuencies 
to the use of cordless phones, wireless routers, or other similar low-power devices.  And Starbucks 
can eliminate further conflicts; instead of invite any and all ISPs to set-up local area networks in its 
stores, it designates an exclusive provider.  Those not paying for service are denied access. The 
“spectrum commons” has been locally privatized, creating a fee-based service supplied solely by 
AT&T, one of the nation’s largest mobile wireless carriers.
102 What is clear is that such services 
provide social value.  What remains unclear, given the lack of a market for the spectrum inputs 
consumed, is that the opportunities consumed by the government’s spectrum allocation do not exceed 
these benefits.  Net social value may well have been higher had companies like Starbucks, AT&T, 
and Cisco (a large maker of Wi-Fi hotspot routers) been forced to economize on spectrum resources 
by purchasing them in the market – just as AT&T does when acquiring billions of dollars worth of 
liberal licenses, making wireless access available to its millions of mobile subscribers. 
 
What works in a Starbucks does not necessarily produce benefits exceeding social opportunity 
costs.  Nor does it scale to other useful wireless applications.  Indeed, the rules that allow the 
beneficial deployment of short range devices in a home or enterprise make the deployment of wide 
area networks – particularly for services involving the economic and technical complexity of mobile 
access – extremely problematic.  The local Wi-Fi link that connects clustered, fixed users to a WAN 
relies on private property rights to radio spectrum to transport data to distant networks.  Just as the 
cordless phone depends on, and does not replace, the telephone network, the cordless PC depends on, 
and does not displace, the wired or wireless wide area network.  
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V.  BROADCASTING LICENSES: A BLAST FROM THE PAST 
 
According to the exclusivity critique, the central problem in spectrum is that ownership rights 
result in the wasting of bandwidth.  In any given geographic area, many channels in a licensed system 
are empty much of the time.
103   This was not always the case, according to spectrum commons 
advocates.  Licensing was perhaps needed in 1927, but only because the broadcast radios of that era 
weren’t smart.  Things are very different today.  Technology, they claim, makes once-scarce spectrum 
plentiful.
104  To prove this proposition, commons advocates have measured “actual usage” in “the 
most active channels of the broadcast bands…. during peak hours in the highly populated, Dupont 
Circle area of Washington, DC.”
105  These measurements are believed to establish that “[m]ost of the 
spectrum is empty in most places most of the time.”
106 
But the measurements equate emitted radiation with actual usage, disregarding the economic 
value generated.  Under this scale, a broadcast tower emitting a 1,000,000-watt test pattern signal is not a 
waste of spectrum and electricity but a highly utilized frequency band.  And even if spectrum use 
measurements were correctly done, they would reveal an even more sweeping indictment: the absence of 
effective airwave ownership cripples the process by which frequency spaces are bid into their highest-
valued uses.
107  Administrative allocation leaves regulators in charge of resource choices, meaning that 
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interest group competition rules the roost.  The ugly result is that airwaves are systematically under-
utilized, maximizing not consumer welfare but the political interests of influential coalitions.  
The historical origins of this system are instructive.  In 1920, Westinghouse inaugurated the 
nation’s first successful radio station, KDKA, in Pittsburgh.
108  Hundreds of other new stations began 
broadcasting shortly thereafter.  Each transmitter was required to obtain a license from the Department of 
Commerce under the 1912 Radio Act.
109  While anyone could register for a license, and the Commerce 
Department had no basis on which to deny it, the agency was permitted to issue the license under terms 
“minimizing interference.”
110  In 1922, the Commerce Department established rules for allocating 
frequency slots on a first-come, first-served basis.
111  The government then delayed or encumbered new 
licenses (mandating time-sharing agreements, for example) to effectively protect existing stations from 
encroachment by entrants.
112 
The de facto property system, based on common law principles of priority-in-use or right of user, 
successfully launched the emerging medium.  By the mid-1920s, and prior to any “public interest” 
licensing law, radio had become an extremely popular mass-market commodity.
113  Yet key policy 
makers were not happy with this result, as the first-come-first-served approach severely limited their  
degrees of freedom.  The Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, was vocal in his support for more 
administrative discretion, as was Sen. Clarence C. Dill (D-WA), a congressional leader in the area.
114 
Just as importantly, large incumbent radio stations sought a greater level of security.  While 
priority-in-use protected their signals, it also created a risk of competitive entry.  That is to say, new 
spectrum could potentially be claimed by new rivals.  The broadcast stations sought a regulatory solution 
under which barriers could be legally erected to prevent this; the standard of “public interest, 
convenience, or necessity” – first suggested by the newly-formed National Association of Broadcasters 
in 1925 – was such a rule.
115  Large commercial radio stations formed a coalition with key policy makers 
and ultimately gained passage of the Radio Act of 1927, placing radio broadcasting under the new 
Federal Radio Commission (“FRC”).
116  The FRC was empowered to license transmitters, assign 
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frequencies, prescribe service limits, and approve the locations and power levels of transmitters 
according to “public interest” criteria.  These policies were carried forward by the Communications Act 
of 1934, which transplanted the FRC into a newly-constituted Federal Communications Commission.
117 
Both policy makers and powerful incumbent stations gained from the bargain contained in the 
1927 and 1934 acts.  Regulators gained considerable control over the operations of licensees, including 
the ability to influence program content.  And because license holders would be restricted to explicitly 
authorized activities, competition between licensees could be limited.  New services, technologies, and 
business models were barred – forming, effectively, a government-enforced cartel.  Later, law and 
economics scholars would characterize the general arrangement as “Taxation by Regulation.”
118  
Reducing competition via legal barriers increases profits; regulators then redirect some of the economic 
gains towards “public interest” expenditures.  
FCC spectrum allocation proved bureaucratically tidy but economically inflexible.  First, the 
FCC would zone the real estate.  It assigned large blocks of spectrum for particular uses such as AM 
radio or VHF TV.  Then it sliced each block into smaller licenses and assigned them to individual firms.  
Licensees got no “property rights” in spectrum;
119 licenses typically expired after eight years,
120 and they 
could not be transferred without Commission approval.
121  Between 1927 and the early 1970s, the FCC 
promulgated a dense web of rules governing license retention and alienability, transmission and 
programming rights, signal privacy, and content – rules like the “fairness doctrine” or an obligation to 
air programs deemed educational for children.  Broadcasters, for example, were barred early on from 
using their main frequencies and facilities to transmit private, addressed messages to specific 
receivers – essentially telephone or telegraph services.
122 
The traditional licensing approach results in vast waste of bandwidth precisely because 
licensees are given no ownership in the underlying spectrum but are instead restricted to specific uses 
of a radio technology defined by the regulator.  Without spectrum ownership, private parties cannot 
transact to make more valuable use of idle frequencies.  The tragedy is not the overuse of the 
commons, but its underuse.
123  In theory, the regulatory agency could prevent this, but it is not vested 
with real ownership, is unable effectively to finance productive, spectrum-enhancing investments, 
and receives no reward for generating extra social value.  These misaligned incentives create “non-
market failure.”
124 
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Shifting to liberal licenses –granting wireless service providers exclusive rights and broad 
flexibility to use allocated spectrum – remedies this tragedy, creating the legal institutions to support  
Coasean contracting.  These unleash incentives to invest in complementary assets that improve the 
productivity of airwaves, creating value for wireless users, some of which can then be captured by 
spectrum owners.  This property structure enables complex organizational efforts, including those 
involving billions of dollars in risk capital dependent on the actions of millions of customers far into 
the future.  
In sum, the case for un-licensing spectrum today is based on the deficiencies of a broadcast 
licensing policy established in the 1920s, and largely repudiated by spectrum policies that emerged in 
the U.S. and elsewhere in the 1980s and 1990s.  Broadcasting is no longer dominant, having been 
eclipsed in value terms by the world of mobile communications.  The licenses that enable those 
markets are sufficiently liberal as to represent de facto ownership of radio spectrum.  The traditional 
licensing regime, despite the continued support of political survivalists in broadcasting, is universally 
recognized as obsolete.  Grounded as it is on a critique of the 1927 Radio Act, the case for un-
licensing spectrum targets a corpse, oblivious to the thundering herd now dominating 
communications markets via exclusive spectrum rights. 
 
VI.  WIRELESS CARRIERS AND FLEXIBLE LICENSES 
One group of “broadcasters” has already completed a very successful transition from the old 
ways of licensing to the new.  Radio dispatch services – used by taxicab companies, for example – 
once operated much like radio stations, under licenses that narrowly specified the service to be 
provided and the technology to be used.  In 1987, a former FCC lawyer named Morgan O’Brien 
teamed up with an investment banker and began buying up dispatch companies – and their 
Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) licenses – across the country.
125  Their company, FleetCall, then put 
forward a plan asking regulators to approve a technical upgrade for SMR licenses: they sought the 
right to deploy digital instead of analog radios.  (The technological innovation would have violated 
license terms – hence the petition for license modification.) 
   The license modification also sought permission to use the extra capacity made possible by 
the technical upgrade for cellular phone calls.  Such requests are met with strong opposition from 
established interests, and are typically deterred; why spend scarce resources on such low-probability 
payoffs?  But Morgan O’Brien believed that his knowledge of the Commission and the timing of this 
proposal – with the explosion of cellular use and the drift in de-regulatory philosophy – brightened 
FleetCall’s prospects.   Some years and $2 million in legal fees later (as against an estimated $20 
million for opponents of the requested rule changes),
126 the underdog received approval.
127 
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FleetCall adopted a new Motorola technology (iDEN, based on Time Division Multiple 
Access or “TDMA”), greatly expanding network capacity.
128  In March 1993, the “taxi dispatch” 
company renamed itself Nextel.
129  In 1995, wireless pioneer Craig McCaw invested $1.1 billion.
130  
Motorola improved iDEN to enable data and fax communications in addition to voice, along with 
two-way dispatch and paging applications.
131  By 2003, FleetCall had acquired spectrum rights in the 
700, 800, and 900 MHz bands,
132 and was operating one of the largest digital networks in the 
country.
133  It executed a “spectrum swap” with the FCC, reducing interference that its phones caused 
to adjacent public service (fire, police, etc.) frequencies, receiving spectrum holdings in the 1.9 GHz 
band.
134  It then acquired several 2.1 and 2.5 GHz licenses, and established partnerships and roaming 
agreements giving it national coverage.
135  In 2005, Nextel – providing push-to-talk walkie-talkie 
service, wireless data services, wireless Internet access, and short messaging to roughly 17 million 
customers
136 – was sold to  Sprint for an acquisition price of $35 billion.
137 




140 and other mobile networks received cellular licenses – initially 
issued by the government in lotteries
141 – largely through secondary market purchases.  The early 
cellular networks were required to build systems incorporating the analog Advanced Mobile Phone 
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Systems (“AMPS”) standard.  In 1988, the FCC relaxed this requirement, allowing operators to 
upgrade to a digital standard of their choosing, though still requiring that they maintain the old AMPS 
system as well.
142  That was an important policy pivot which pointed the way to further liberalization. 
In 1993, with the FCC getting ready to assign new Personal Communications Services (PCS) 
licenses, adding competitors to cellular, Congress ordered that all wireless phone rivals be regulated 
under a unified Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) designation.
143  Cellular, PCS, and SMR 
--  the reinvented taxi dispatcher – would operate as direct rivals with broad, flexible-use spectrum 
rights.
144  This codified what the FCC had already begun to implement, pre-empted state rate 
regulation, and for the first time permitted licenses to be assigned through competitive bidding.
145  
Chairman Reed Hundt remarked: “We totally deregulated wireless.”
146 
Carriers seized the opportunity to deploy a range of digital voice technologies – not only 
TDMA, but also GSM (the standard used most widely in the rest of world), and Code Division 
Multiple Access (“CDMA”), a rival standard developed by San Diego-based Qualcomm.  These 
technologies have permitted aggressive upgrades over the years to second, third, and fourth 
generation (2G, 3G, and 4G in industry parlance) systems that have paved the way for innovative 
wireless services and devices.  GSM networks, which AT&T and T-Mobile deploy, have evolved 
from EDGE to UMTS to HSDPA technology. CDMA networks, which Verizon and Sprint have 
deployed, evolved from IS-95, CDMA2000 1x, to EV-DO, to EV-DO Revision A.  All four wireless 
carriers have recently begun yet another new upgrade -- to Long Term Evolution ("LTE") technology, 
which offers download speeds to mobile handsets of up to 100 Mbps. 
This progression occurs seamlessly, without disturbing network users, but requires vast 
resources: over $20 billion annually in network capital expenditure.
147 Customers spend billions more 
per year on handsets – an estimated $22.2 billion in 2009.
148  With licensees given wide latitude to 
choose the technologies deployed and the services offered, firms compete vigorously to improve 
services, upgrade architectures, cut prices and provide popular platforms for third party content.   
Market forces compel efficiency of spectrum use in these bands.
149 
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Wireless license auctions have likewise been a success.  Since competitive bidding began in 
1994, the government has realized $52.6 billion in receipts.
150  These numbers confirm the obvious: 
wireless service providers will pay substantial sums to avoid having to operate in a “spectrum 
commons.”  Any firm has the choice to do otherwise, deploying state-of-the-art radios, spread spectrum 
devices, mesh Wi-Fi networks, or array antennae put forward as exhibits for the proposition that   
exclusive spectrum rights have outlived their usefulness.  Yet, in March 2008, telecommunications firms 
shelled out $19.6 billion to acquire exclusive access to 52 MHz of prime frequencies – paying far higher 
prices than in previous FCC auctions on an adjusted “per MHz-pop” basis.
151  That firms reject 
available “free” spectrum in unlicensed bands and instead bid aggressively to acquire liberal licenses 
suggests that exclusive spectrum ownership is expected to offer productive efficiencies.   
The standard explanation of private property rights in the economics literature is that a grant 
of exclusive control creates incentives for resource conservation and improvement.
152  L i b e r a l  
spectrum licenses promote precisely these outcomes. Between 1985 and 2008, cellular networks built 
approximately 242,000 cell sites,
153 investing some $265 billion in the process.
154  CMRS network 
and end-user equipment evolved rapidly, smoothly transitioning from analog to digital service. 
Advanced compression technologies and smart antennas have been widely deployed, allowing 
carriers to pack more and more traffic into given bandwidth.  For example, CDMA handsets are 
programmed to check 800 times per second for the lowest possible power level that maintains a link 
to the base station; GSM over 1,000 times.  Dynamic power adjustment reduces spillovers, allowing 
more phone calls to be made.
155  These innovations and a host of others have resulted in increasingly 
intense use of frequency space.  In 1993, a 10 km cell served, on average, fewer than seven 




Thus, over two decades, great progress has been made in creating exclusive, flexible-use, 
geographically defined spectrum licenses.  CMRS operators have freedom to choose what kind of 
network equipment to deploy and what services to offer.   The approach has also given rise to the 
regulatory innovation of “overlay” rights.  Bands littered with incumbent users, but containing 
substantially under-utilized “white spaces,” are shared with new, encumbered licenses.  The new licensee 
                                                 
150  Federal Communications Commission, Statement by FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin, News Release (March 18, 
2008).  The Commission raised $13.9 billion in the Sept. 2006 Advanced Wireless Services license sale, $19.6 billion in 
the March 2008 700 MHz license auction, and another $19.1 billion for all other licenses.  
151   Price comparisons are generally made by adjusting for the bandwidth allocated the license (MHz) and the population 
in the coverage area of the license (pop).  The 700 MHz auction brought an average winning bid of $1.28 per MHz-pop, 
while the 2006 AWS auction averaged 53¢.  Mindel de la Torre, U.S. Spectrum Update: 700 MHz Band and Advanced 
Wireless Services (AWS), presentation to Spectrum 20/20 Rendez-Vous 2008 (Ottawa, Canada; May 6, 2008); 
http://www.rabc-cccr.ca/Files/Mindel-Mindel1.pdf.  The one large previous auction for broadband PCS licenses, the A-B 
auction concluded in March 1995, generated total bids of $7.7 billion and an average price equal to 51¢ per MHz-pop. 
152   Demsetz, Property Rights. 
153   CTIA, Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_Year-End_2008_Graphics.pdf. 
154   CTIA database. 
155 H o w  t o  M a k e  3 G  W o r k  i n  E u r o p e ,  The Economist (Sept. 26, 2002);   
http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=1353050.  
156   CTIA Interference Temperature Brief at 5. Draft 
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can emit, with broad flexibility, in the allotted frequencies, while respecting the operations of existing 
users who are grandfathered to continue transmitting.  Incumbents are free to “sell out” to the new 
licensee, moving operations to other bands, fixed links, or ceasing altogether, with the overlay licensee 
capturing the benefits created.   
 
Overlays effectively cede the task of spectrum reallocation to markets, endowing the overlay 
licensee with property rights to the fruits of whatever new, innovative band uses it can create. For 
example, new PCS licensees relocated 4,500 microwave incumbents, paying their moving costs, in order 
to take full advantage of their spectrum.
157 Likewise, in the 700 MHz band, Qualcomm paid dozens of 
TV stations on Channels 54, 55, and 56 to accept interference so that Qualcomm’s new mobile TV 
application, MediaFlo, could launch nationwide service in 2007.
158  Similar overlays are also used in the 
AWS frequencies, where licenses were auctioned in 2006.
159 
 
No alternative property regime allows such efficiencies.  In unlicensed bands, the deal-makers 
necessary for efficient coordination do not exist, which is exactly why such “commons” must rely on 
spectrum allocations, power limits, and technology mandates pre-set by regulators.  Commons advocates 
have argued that abundant economic unlicensed activity now takes place in what were formerly 
considered “junk” or “garbage bands,” useless for productive activity.
160  But liberally licensed bands 
have likewise often started with “garbage,” and then struck gold by moving thousands of polluters out.  
The unlicensed bands host valuable applications, but only by powering down, accepting intermittent 
interference, and living amongst the “garbage.”  This not only severely limits the potential of such bands, 
but also deters certain unlicensed frequencies, including those allocated to U-PCS and to the 3650-3700 
MHz band, from providing net social value.  Hamstrung by FCC rules and assigned to no owner, these 
bands are stuck in the bowels of administrative process. 
 
VII.  THE QUIET PAST AND NOISY FUTURE 
There was no demand for spectrum before 1895 because nobody yet knew how to build a 
radio.  Nobody needed any two years later, either.  Guglielmo Marconi had demonstrated the basic 
engineering, but it would take another thirty years to develop products and business models to move 
hundreds of broadcast stations and millions of receivers into the mass market – enough radio hardware to 
spawn the conflicts that impelled the creation of a legal regime to police spectrum access.   
To frame this history in terms relevant to the current debate, licenses matter when radio 
technologies and markets evolve to the point where things get crowded.  The commons advocates insist 
                                                 
157   Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel & John Williams, Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents, 41 J L & Econ 647 
(Oct. 1998). 
158   Thomas W. Hazlett, A Law & Economics Approach to Spectrum Property Rights: A Response to Weiser and Hatfield, 
15 Geo Mason L. R. 975 (Spring 2008) (Hazlett, Spectrum Property Rights) at 1000-1004. 
159   See, e.g., Spectrum Sharing and Incumbent Relocation Services for AWS Licensees, Comsearch (April 11, 2008); 
http://www.commscope.com/andrew/eng/support_document/spec_sheets/network/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2008/04/11/BN_P
A_101102_1_EN.pdf.  
160 Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum Commons, 74 FORDHAM L REV 101 (2005) (“Weiser & 
Hatfield, Spectrum Commons”) at 101. Draft 
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that when the technology is smart enough, things never get crowded.  That story is exactly backwards.  
Setting aside regulatory barriers, it is the slow arrival of technology that has left some bands relatively 
empty.  Bands that were empty a decade ago are crowded today in large measure because affordable new 
products have arrived to fill them.  Technology is not the solution to spectrum scarcity, but its cause.  As 
wireless technologies become smart, cheap, and ubiquitous, the social value of property rights – helping 
to create the platforms on which such burgeoning economic activity can be best accommodated – rises.   
We face lots of spectrum scarcity looking forward.  A radio’s power amplifier is the toughest 
part to build, and the higher the frequency, the tougher it gets.  Twenty years ago, no one knew how 
to build the high-frequency gallium arsenide chip-scale amplifiers that now power many Wi-Fi 
radios.  Wi-Fi radios operate at 2.4 and 5 GHz, and cheap, compact chip-scale amplifiers capable of 
handling such high frequencies hadn’t been developed until around that time.  (To put the technical 
challenges involved here in perspective, recall that a state-of-the art Pentium microprocessor operates 
at “only” 3 GHz.)  Military research funded the development of this exotic semiconductor,
161 and 
licensed wireless carriers created the mass-market demand by selling millions of cell phones.
162  In 
that sense, Wi-Fi took a free ride on technological innovation in licensed bands. 
Unsurprisingly, the history of FCC licensing has tracked the progressive march of radio-
amplifier technology up the frequency ladder – if with significant, wealth-destroying lags.
163  And the 
FCC’s allocation of spectrum for mass-market licensed services has largely tracked the frequency-
climbing evolution of radios.  See Figure 2.  The amount of usable spectrum continues to expand 
because engineers continue to push radio frequencies up into higher bands, and radio costs down.  
The spectrum always looks un-crowded to pioneers at the very top of the ladder.  Then, when costs 
drop and regulatory barriers fall, crowds follow. 
                                                 
161 See TRW News Release, TRW To Fabricate Advanced Integrated Circuits for RF Micro Devices (Dec. 7, 1993) 
(“Much of TRW’s [gallium arsenide (GaAs)] chip manufacturing expertise was developed as part of the Microwave and 
Millimeter Wave Monolithic Integrated Circuits (MIMIC) program sponsored by the Department of Defense’s Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA). . . . The MIMIC program was begun in 1987 by ARPA to make GaAs integrated 
circuits producible, affordable and applicable to a wide range of critical defense system needs.”). 
162 See, e.g., T. Whitaker, SiGe and CMOS Target GaAs Dominance of Cellular PA Slots, CompoundSemiconducter.Net 
(May 2004), http://www.compoundsemiconductor.net/articles/magazine/10/5/3/1 (“[I]n the largest market segment, 
[power amplifiers] for cellular handsets, GaAs enjoys almost total dominance, and accounted for well over 95% of 
handset [power amplifier] revenues [in 2003], according to market research firm ABI Research.”). 
163   Cellular phone allocations were delayed from the late 1940s, when cellular technology was developed by Bell Labs, 
until licenses were distributed in the 1980s -- one notable example of regulatory lag.  See George Calhoun, Digital 
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The bands being occupied today have an additional feature: many high-frequency 
transmissions are easily blocked by physical obstacles, rain, and so forth.  DBS satellites, for 
example, broadcast at 12 GHz.  At this frequency, signals are blocked by foliage, so the pizza-sized 
receiving antennas require a treeless line of sight to the southern sky.  Heavy rain can also block these 
signals.  By contrast, the Navy’s ultra-low-frequency radios can communicate with submerged 
submarines.  That high-frequency signals are easily blocked is a perfectly schizophrenic blessing, as 
the Wi-Fi experience again teaches.  One Wi-Fi radio is unlikely to interfere with another when 
shielding supplied by walls and trees sharply limits its range.  But that same limit is what makes it 
relatively costly to scale Wi-Fi deployments for many applications larger than a Starbucks.   
 
VIII.   FROM LMDS TO WIMAX 
Consider the evolution of Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks (“WMANs”).  These 
technologies support wireless links that can span distances of up to 30 miles; they can be used to 
backhaul traffic from local points of aggregation, or to provide last-mile broadband connectivity 
directly to customers.
164  The first-generation WMAN technologies (LMDS and MMDS, for 
example) and the second (WiMax and Mobile Fi) were both designed to operate principally in 
                                                 
164  FCC Task Force Paper at 20 (“Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks (WMANs) are point-to-point or point-to-
multipoint networks with individual links that not only can span distances of up to 30 miles, which is important for 
backhaul applications, but also can provide last-mile connectivity in metropolitan environments.”). Draft 
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licensed bands.  Unlicensed bands are viewed as viable alternatives only in the sparsely populated 
rural locations. 
The first major wave of investment in WMAN technologies occurred shortly after passage of 
the 1996 Telecom Act.  Between 1997 and 2000, the FCC licensed several large parcels of spectrum 
for these services – the 24 GHz band allocated for Digital Electronic Messaging Service 
(“DEMS”),
165 the 27-31GHz bands allocated to Local Multipoint Distribution System,
166 and the 39 
GHz band.
167  These high frequencies provide very large amounts of bandwidth, but signals carry 
only a couple of miles, and require a clear line of sight.
168  Companies like Teligent, WinStar, and 
NextLink (later XO) bid aggressively to acquire blocks of spectrum that serve more than 90 percent 
of the population in 30 U.S. markets.
169  By year-end 2001, these companies had spent over $10 
billion building out their networks.
170  But the radios and receivers capable of handling these high 
frequencies were still very expensive, and much less reliable than wireline alternatives.
171  These 
first-generation services all failed when Wall Street’s dot-com bubble collapsed.
172 
                                                 
165 See Amendments to Parts 1, 2, 87 and 101 of the Commission’s Rules To License Fixed Services at 24 GHz, Report 
and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 16934, ¶¶ 3-4 (2000) (DEMS services were initially allocated spectrum in the 18 GHz band.  This 
allocation was then moved to a different section of the same 18 GHz band.  DEMS was finally relocated to the 24 GHz 
band in 1997.). 
166 See FCC LMDS Factsheet at 1.  There are two LMDS licenses issued in each of 493 Basic Trading Areas (BTAs).  
Frequency Block A licenses are for 1.15 GHz in the 27.5-28.35 GHz, 29.1-29.25 GHz, and 31.075-31.225 GHz bands; 
Frequency Block B licenses are for 150 MHz in the 31-31.075 GHz and 31.225-31.300 GHz bands.  See Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau, FCC, Factsheet for Auction 17 ( Local Multipoint Distribution System) (LMDS), 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_factsheet&id=17. 
167  See  Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, FCC, Factsheet for Auction 30 (39 GHz), 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_factsheet&id=30 (“39 GHz licensees may provide fixed 
communications including point-to-point and point-to-multipoint communications”). 
168 K. Wanichkorn, Ph.D., Thailand Rural Wireless Broadband Access Initiative, presentation before APT Regional 
Forum for ICT Experts in South-East Asia, Jakarta, Indonesia (Feb. 4-5, 2004) (“High Microwave Frequencies 
(>10GHz)” work at “[s]hort propagation distances (3-5km) and require line-of-sight.”); A. Langowski, LMDS Hits the 
Spot?, CED MAGAZINE (Feb. 1, 2001), http://www.cedmagazine.com/ced/2001/0201/id2.htm (LMDS “systems operate 
only over short distances.”). 
169  Id. 
170 See, e.g., L. Whiteman, TeraGo Lands $20M in First Round, DAILY DEAL (Apr. 24, 2001) (“Winstar spent more than 
$6 billion building its network, according to estimates by Boston consulting firm Adventis.”); J. Barthold, Teligent Faces 
New Sober Reality, TELEPHONY (Sept. 16, 2002) (“We had $2 billion to $3 billion thrown at us.”) (quoting Teligent 
Marketing VP, Denisse Goldbarg); Infospace Adds to Senior Management Team, Business Wire (Apr. 2, 2003) (noting 
that NEXTLINK raised more than $4 billion in capital). 
171  See,  e.g.,  Intel and Clearwire Forge WiMAX Alliance, THE  REGISTER (Oct. 29, 2004), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/10/29/intel_clearwire_wimax/ (“The most critical element in the bursting of the last 
BWA bubble was the cost of subscriber equipment. . . . [T]he critical stumbling block for Winstar [was] the expensive, 
proprietary subscriber equipment.” at 25.  
172 M. McCormack, et al., Bear Stearns, Wireless Broadband: The Impact of 802 Technology  at 17, Exhibit 7.  Draft 
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As markets recovered and radios in these bands improved,
173 the licenses returned to 
investors’ radar screens.
174  New firms with new business models acquired the licenses in the 24, 27-
31, and 39 GHz bands.  Companies like First Avenue Networks
175 and IDT
176 began leasing this 
spectrum wholesale to providers of high-speed Internet access, mobile carriers providing backhaul 
services, and wireline carriers that are building wireless extensions to their fiber-optic networks. This 
reallocation of spectrum to new and hopefully more valuable employments is an automatic function 
of exclusive rights, even through the disruption of bankruptcy.  Indeed, trial and error is a socially 
useful discovery process when incentives guide investors to place the best bets, generating “creative 
destruction” that iterates on new efficiencies and produces technological disruptions of its own. 
A new family of fixed wireless technologies – commonly known as WiMax – emerged in 
parallel.  The original WiMax standard (IEEE 802.16) was developed to operate in licensed bands 
between 10 and 66 GHz.
177  Recent versions of the standard support both licensed and unlicensed 
operations between 2-11 GHz,
178 including licensed bands at 2.5 GHz and 3.5 GHz, and the 
unlicensed 5.8 GHz band that Wi-Fi uses.
179 
The new investment, however, is dominated by operators that will use licensed spectrum – 
equipment manufacturers and service providers have both concluded that this is where the most 
promising opportunities lie.  Clearwire has aggregated licenses in the 2.5 GHz band pursuant to a 
series of FCC rulings expanding licensee rights to allow two-way, cellularized, broadband services.
180  
By 2009, it was offering wireless broadband service in at least 56 markets, including Anchorage, 
Seattle, Jacksonville, Waco, Reno, and Rochester, New York,
181 and deploying 4G networks in 
Atlanta, Baltimore Las Vegas, and Portland, Oregon.  With ambitious plans for national rollout,
182 It 
                                                 
173   Id. at 25 (June 2004) (noting that prices for CPE are still high, but “[t]he consensus from our interviews is that prices 
will be halved over the next two years, reaching a $100 price point within five years.”); id. at 26 (The current generation 
of wireless broadband equipment is “greatly improved over equipment from the 1990s.”). 
174   See, e.g., First Avenue Networks Press Release, First Avenue Networks Closes Acquisition of Teligent Assets (Jan. 18, 
2005); M. Dano, Nextel Adds to MMDS Spectrum, RCR WIRELESS NEWS (Nov. 10, 2003.); in 2006, First Avenue was 
acquired by FiberTower, First Avenue Networks Press Release (May 15, 2006); 
http://www.fibertower.com/corp/downloads/investors/FT_FAN_Release.pdf.   
175 See First Avenue Networks, Solutions, http://www.firstavenet.com/solutions.htm; IDT Press Release, IDT Spectrum, 
Inc. Names Peter B. Atwal, President, Engineering and Operations (Apr. 28, 2005) (“IDT Spectrum, Inc. is the recently 
formed subsidiary of IDT Corporation that operates and markets wireless spectrum products and solutions.”).  
176 IDT Corp. Press Release, IDT Corp. Announces the Acquisition of Winstar Communications, Inc. (Dec. 20, 2001). 
177 IEEE 802.16 Backgrounder, ieee802.org/16/pub/backgrounder.html. 
178 IEEE 802.16 Backgrounder, ieee802.org/16/pub/backgrounder.html. 
179  See,  Understanding Wi-fi and WiMAX as Metro-Access Solutions, Intel White Paper (2004) at 10, 
http://www.intel.com/netcomms/technologies/wimax/304471.pdf (“Intel, WiMax”). 
180   For the long regulatory history of 2.5 GHz licenses, see Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies. 
181  Clearwire Corp., Clearwire Markets, http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/irol/21/214419/mediakit/Market_List_12309.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).  
182  Clearwire Press Release, Clearwire Reports Second Quarter 2009 Results (Aug. 11, 2009);  Draft 
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served 511,000 subscribers by June 30, 2009,
183 at least thirty times any WISP reling on access to 
unlicensed airwaves.
184 
Carriers that have used unlicensed spectrum have done so predominantly in rural areas.
185  
Intel, often a strong advocate of unlicensed spectrum, has concluded that to function as a “carrier-
grade technology” WiMax requires licensed spectrum.
186  “In general,” Intel concludes, “unlicensed 
bands can be subject to [service quality] issues because deployment is open to anyone.”
187  More 
important is the market reality that firms seeking to build substantial wireless networks requiring 
large amounts of risk capital overwhelmingly favor liberal licenses.  Clearwire itself began, in 1999, 
as a WISP operating “in the unlicensed 2.4-GHz frequency, which was subject to interference.”  It 
found that it could lease bandwidth from educational institutions with ITFS (Instructional Television 
Fixed Service) licenses, upgrading its service and allowing it to craft an ambitious service strategy.
188 
In that pursuit it has attracted powerful economic support, registering over $4 billion in capital 
infusions from Intel, Motorola, Bell Canada, Google, Sprint, Comcast, Time Warner, Bright House 
Networks, and thousands of equity investors buying the firm’s shares in its 2007 IPO.
189  T h e  
financial meltdown of 2008-09 adversely impacted share prices; about one-half of Clearwire’s 
strategic investment was written off in early 2009.  This is entirely consistent with the social 
efficiencies created by such investment incentives.  Only when firms suffer the adverse consequences 
of the spectrum risks they take will their incentives be fully aligned with the interests of consumers.  
When, conversely, Apple Computer lobbied the FCC for an Unlicensed PCS frequency allocation in 
the early 1990s, prompting the Commission to allocate 30 MHz for U-PCS that has gone essentially 
unused for over a decade, the loss was socialized. Apple internalized only the cost of its lobbying.
190 
                                                 
183   Clearwire Press Release, Clearwire Reports Second Quarter 2009 Results (Aug. 11, 2009) (This number includes a 
small fraction of non-US subscribers – generating 13% of the company’s total revenue). 
184   “Top Ten” Wireless Internet Service Providers 2007, Broadband Wireless Exchange Magazine, 
http://www.bbwexchange.com/wireless_isp/ (visited Feb. 27, 2009) (In its last ranking of Top Wireless ISPs, Broadband 
Wireless Exchange Magazine listed SpeedNet the third largest WISP with 15,000 customers.  The two higher ranking 
ISPs (one of which was Clearwire) both use licensed spectrum in the 2.5 GHz band; it was not specified whether 
SpeedNet used licensed, unlicensed, or both.); see also  Kenyon Communications Holdings, Inc., Form 10-Q at 13 (SEC 
filed June 30, 2009).  
185 See Intel, WiMax at 6, http://www.intel.com/netcomms/technologies/wimax/306013.pdf (“[L]icense-exempt WiMAX 
solutions are focused on rural areas. . .”). 
186 The “big difference between Wi-Fi and WiMAX . . . is that we’re going to use licensed spectrum to deliver WiMAX.”  
Intel,  WiMAX:  Wireless Broadband for the World – An Interview with Jim Johnson, 
http://www.intel.com/netcomms/columns/jimj105.htm (quoting James A. Johnson, VP, Intel Communications Group and 
General Manager, Wireless Networking Group).  See also McCormack, et al., Wireless Broadband (“In our view, the use 
of licensed spectrum is necessary to guarantee a level of service and availability for the paying portable user. The use of 
unlicensed spectrum could lead to wide disparities in quality of service, bottlenecks, and security issues.”). 
187  Intel, Understanding Wi-fi and WiMAX as Metro-Access Solutions, White Paper at 3 (Oct. 2004). 
188   Clearwire, Funding Universe, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Clearwire-Inc-Company-
History.html (visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
189   Id. 
190    Thomas W. Hazlett, The Spectrum-Allocation Debate: An Analysis, IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING (Sept./Oct. 2006). Draft 
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The FCC’s recent proceeding to allocate the 3.65 GHz band for WiMax and related 
technologies was initiated at the behest of wireless WISPs who “expressed a clear need for additional 
spectrum for broadband use . . . especially in rural areas.”
191  The FCC was persuaded, stating that 
allocating the band for unlicensed devices “would be the most beneficial approach.” Still, rural 
WISPs were concerned that “intense use of spectrum by a variety of devices under a traditional 
unlicensed approach could result in mutual interference, thereby reducing the utility of this band.”
192  
In 2005, the Commission ultimately adopted a regime that eschews assigning any spectrum “for the 
exclusive use of any licensee,” and instead directs all licensees “to cooperate and avoid harmful 
interference to one another.”
193 
Everyone operating in these bands must “register… their fixed and base stations in a common 
database.”
194  And any interference between these high-power transmitters “will be addressed by the 
process we adopt to register fixed and base stations.”
195  Registration rules require base stations to 
“operate at locations and with technical parameters that will minimize the potential for interference 
between stations.”
196 
The better this works in the short term, the faster its fundamental shortcomings will become 
apparent.  Many companies will certainly want to offer WiMax service, competing in the $32 billion 
per year U.S. market for DSL and cable modem services.
197  Spectrum-sharing protocols in WiMax 
radios can provide for orderly, reasonable sharing of spectrum – under certain circumstances.  But 
they don’t limit how many radios are deployed to share it. 
Just as power limits are an implicit exclusionary device, a registration policy is likewise an 
acknowledgement of the benefits of coordinating spectrum users and an implicit rejection of the ad 
hoc “commons” approach.  The unlicensed space is in some sense licensed, but without the benefit of 
de facto (or de jure) spectrum ownership.  Under this hybrid approach, there are no claimants to seek 
gains from efficient spectrum reallocation – for example, to clear the 3650 MHz band of the satellite 
operations that could impinge on the use of WiMax devices.  In a liberal license regime, licencees 
could pay satellite operators to move to alternative bands, expanding opportunities for WiMax. Under 
the hybrid approach, it is regulators, not market forces, that ultimately set sharing rules. 
                                                 
191 Wireless Operations in the 3650-3700 MHz Band, Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 FCC 
Rcd 6502, ¶ 13 (2005) (“3.65 GHz Order”). 
192  Id. ¶¶ 13-14. 
193  Id. App. A & ¶ 29.  All licensees are required “to cooperate and avoid harmful interference to one another.”  Id. ¶ 29.  
All WiMAX radios must incorporate protocols to determine who gets priority when “when two or more devices attempt to 
simultaneously access the same channel.”  Id. ¶ 58.  These same protocols will “establish[] rules by which each device is 
provided a reasonable opportunity to operate.”  Id. ¶ 16.  By “control[ing] access to spectrum, terrestrial operations will 




197 Ray Le Maistre, US Tops Broadband Revenues Chart, LIGHTREADING.COM (Jan. 2, 2009) 
http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=169812 (“According to data compiled for the report, Global Fixed 
and Mobile Broadband Outlook, the U.S. generated more than $32 billion in broadband revenues in 2008.”) Draft 
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What advantage does such state control afford society?  The reflex response – that it protects 
spectrum access on a no-fee basis – is strictly correct.  But the outcome of this regime can render 
“free” access a high-cost failure.  If the coordination supplied by exclusive rights owners results in 
networks and wireless applications that are superior from the viewpoint of consumers, then the 
relative social benefits of the non-exclusive rights are negative.   
U.S. regulators – just as Coase deduced from basic economic theory -- fail to properly account 
for the opportunity costs of alternative allocations when zoning spectrum.  The results are starkly on 
display in the 3650 MHz proceeding.   What is called the 3.5 GHz band includes the 3650-3700 MHz 
frequencies, and is the most popular location for licensed WiMax networks internationally.
198   
Indeed, the IEEE 802.16 (WiMax) technology protocol at 3.5 GHz has been written for exclusive 
rights holders.  U.S. regulators chose to deviate from world markets, a decision strongly opposed by 
Intel and Alvarion, firms with substantial sales of wireless hardware using the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz 
unlicensed bands.  Yet, the companies jointly urged the FCC to license 3650 MHz spectrum in the top 
fifty U.S. markets – areas with the lion’s share of potential customers and those in which potential 
airwave conflicts are most intense.
199  They lost that battle,
200 and the only large-scale WiMax 
developments observed in the U.S. market today are those in the licensed 2.5 GHz band. 
 
IX.  INTERFERENCE 
Smart radios have overcome the problem of interference, commons advocates allege.   
Unlicensed wireless devices may not have legal protection against interference, but they do not need 
any.  It is possible that licensing spectrum may occasionally be useful, just as “toll roads or paid 
carpool lanes” sometimes make sense “in some predictably congestion-prone roads.”
201  But mostly 
we’re dealing here with “city streets and sidewalks, dirt roads, or highways at nighttime.”
202  Smart 
radios are like ships traveling on an ocean of spectrum – not infinite in size, perhaps, but so vast that 
vessels can simply “be trusted to navigate around one another.”
203 
These conclusions are said to flow from the laws of physics.  “[I]nterference is a consequence 
of system design, rather than an inherent property of the radio spectrum.”
204  Interference isn’t 
“physical” but “inherently a legal construct.”
205  ”Interference is a metaphor that paints an old 
                                                 
198 Sam Churchill, Italy Opens 3.5 GHz for WiMax, DAILY  WIRELESS (Dec. 29, 2006); 
http://www.dailywireless.org/2006/12/29/italy-opens-35-ghz-for-wimax/ 
199  Intel et al., Petition for Reconsideration of Intel Corporation, Redline Communications, Inc., Alvarion, Inc., Federal 
Communications Commission ET Docket No. 04-151 (June 10, 2005).   
200   Jerry Brito, The Spectrum Commons in Theory and Practice, 2007 Stan.Tech. L. R. 1 (2007). 
201   Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications at 69. 
202  Id.  See also  id.  at 32-33 (Property rights/pricing mechanisms are “useful only occasionally, at peak utilization 
moments”). 
203 Werbach, Radio Revolution at 20. 
204 Werbach, Radio Revolution at 14. 
205  Id. Draft 
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limitation of technology as a fact of nature.”
206  “Spectrum is not scarce. We're talking about radio 
waves. Radio waves run through one another.”
207  “More than one service can occupy the ‘same’ 
spectrum, in the same place, at the same time.”
208  “The electromagnetic waves do not actually 
bounce off each other or ‘fall’ to the ground before reaching the receiver’s antenna.  ‘Interference’ 
describes the condition of a stupid lone receiver faced with multiple sources of radiation that it is 
trying to decode but, in its simplicity, cannot.”
209  “Radio waves do not . . . cancel each other out.”
210 
A.  Noise and Interference 
But, in fact, they do.  Thomas Young’s double slit experiment, first conducted in 1801 and 
repeated in high-school physics classes to this day, establishes that electromagnetic waves interact, 
interfere, amplify, and obliterate each other like waves on the surface of a pond.  Two clean signals 
superposed become one messy one; throw in more, and you end up with cacophony of pure noise.  
No amount of additional intelligence embedded in the receiver can reverse the process when 
interference transforms information into chaos.
211 
In fact, radios dispatch streams of energy from their antennas, and that energy propagates 
through the surroundings at the speed of light.  These fluxes aren’t legal constructs
212 but physical 
things.  In a microwave oven, they heat your soup.  When they strike a silicon-crystal solar cell, 
electromagnetic energy at a slightly higher frequency can generate electricity.  Suitably synchronized, 
flukes like these become a maser or laser that can cut through steel.  And these same energy fluxes – 
these half-wave half-packet streams of photons – interact, deflecting flows and destroying 
communications.   
Thus, for example, microwave ovens cause “noticeable” interference with Bluetooth devices 
operating nearby.
213  Bluetooth devices interfere with each other.
214  Cell phone jammers are readily 
                                                 
206   David Reed, as quoted in David Weinberger, The Myth of Interference: Internet Architect Explains How Bad Science 
Created the Broadcast Industry, SALON (March 12, 2003); 
http://dir.salon.com/story/tech/feature/2003/03/12/spectrum/index.html?x. 
207  Kevin Werbach, as quoted in Heath Row, The Open Spectrum Revolution, FASTCOMPANY (Feb. 8, 2008); 
http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/heath-row/open-spectrum-revolution. 
208  Werbach, Radio Revolution at 3. 
209  Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications at 39. 
210  Werbach, Radio Revolution at 5. 
211  The concession is made that interference among smart radios is a “realistic possibility… [when] “very large numbers 
of such devices operate in the same location.”  Werbach, Radio Revolution at 17.  That this obviates the claim that 
interference is a myth, or that it fully supports the economic analysis of spectrum scarcity is, however, lost.   
212   Were radio signals “only” legal constructs, the argument over how best to assign property rights would not be 
decided, of course.  Intangible property rights, including those created in contract law, tend to dominate ownership 
institutions in advanced economies.  More generally, all property rights are legal constructs and govern not things but 
relations between people. 
213 T.W. Rondeau, M.F. D’Souza, and D.G. Sweeney, Residential Microwave Oven Interference on Bluetooth Data 
Performance, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONSUMER ELECTRONICS at 856, 863 (Aug. 2004). 
214 J.E. Ballagh, T.W. Rondeau, D.G. Sweeney, Bluetooth Frequency Hop Selection Kernel Impact on ‘Inter-Piconet’ 
Interference, IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics (submitted for publication).  See also J. Lipman, The ‘Other’ 
Wireless Technology Is Alive and Kicking, TECHONLINE (Oct. 14, 2003), Draft 
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available (though illegal
215); it is equally easy to jam Wi-Fi nodes.  The most common form of 
interference arises when a beam from a single transmitter interferes with itself.  This can occur when 
part of a signal travels directly from the tower to the TV, and part travels indirectly, reflecting off 
(say) a nearby skyscraper.  Two different electromagnetic signals cannot in fact coexist at exactly the 
same place and time. 
All else equal, the noisier the electromagnetic environment the longer it takes to transmit 
information through it without distortion.  This too is a fundamental law of physics
216 that 
engineering cannot repeal.  To state the same law another way: to get through at all, a radio 
transmission has to be powerful enough to penetrate the ambient noise. 
The “ambient noise” itself is highly variable.  It is composed of all the radio transmitters –  
“intentional emitters,” in FCC jargon – and all the “incidental” and “unintentional” emitters, 
including virtually every device that runs on AC electric power.  It is therefore impossible to know 
precisely how noisy things will be along any given pathway, at any given point in time; getting a 
signal through is a fundamentally chancy business.
217  You can improve the odds by raising the power 
of your own radio, or lowering the power of other radios transmitting on the same frequencies, or 
shutting down competing radios altogether.  You can switch your own radio to a different band, 
which may be quieter.  And you can transmit the same message more than once, or simultaneously on 
multiple bands. 
But none of these strategies eliminates fundamental economic trade-offs.  Quite the contrary – 
every strategy that boosts the chances of punching your own signal through the airwaves either adds 
to the expense of the communications conducted, lowers the odds for every other radio that’s trying 
to do the same, or both.  It is suggested that by searching for unused gaps in the airwaves, “agile 
radios can in effect manufacture new spectrum.”
218  “In effect,” correct, but in fact radios transmit 
radio signals, and when they do that, they don’t produce spectrum, they consume it. 
The much-heralded smartness of Wi-Fi radios provides a case in point.  When two Wi-Fi 
radios use the same (limited) channels in close proximity, each device detects the presence of a 
competing transmitter and adjusts by transmitting more slowly and using more power to send each 
bit.  As Hewlett-Packard describes it, Wi-Fi radios “fail gracefully in the presence of interference” – 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.techonline.com/community/ed_resource/feature_article/28419  (“[S]imilar to devices operating in the 900 
MHz spectrum interfering with other like-frequency devices, Bluetooth is more prone to interference from other Bluetooth 
devices, cell phones, microwave ovens, and other equipment operating at 2.4 GHz.”); J. Miller, Tips on Using WiFi in RV 
Parks, RVers Online (Mar. 2005), http://www.rversonline.org/RVWiFi.html (“From 4:30 to 6:00 pm each night at every 
RV resort in the country the WiFi signal is impeded the most.  This is due to the concentration of RVs in a relatively small 
area preparing dinner and using Microwave ovens.  The same is true in apartment complexes.”). 
215 The manufacture, importation, sale, and operation of transmitters designed to jam or block signals is a violation of 47 
U.S.C. §§ 301, 302(a), 333, and subject to severe penalties.  “Fines for a first offense can range as high as $11,000 for 
each violation or imprisonment for up to one year.”  See FCC, Cellular Services, Operations:  Blocking & Jamming, 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/services/cellular/operations/blockingjamming.html. 
216 See C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 Bell System Tech. J. 379-423, 623-656, (July & Oct. 
1948), available at http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/ms/what/shannonday/shannon1948.pdf. 
217 Weiser & Hatfield, Spectrum Commons. 
218 Werbach, Radio Revolution at 19 (emphasis added). Draft 
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the “result of increasing levels of interference is almost always confined to a slowing of the data rate 
as more packets need to be resent.”
219  Wi-Fi does not eliminate the interference problem, but 
degrades performance to accommodate it.  This is more acceptable for certain types of data 
transmission where it doesn’t matter too much just how fast the traffic gets through, such as web 
browsing, while less acceptable for voice and other inter-active applications that require steady 
throughput.  
These limitations are costly.  Moreover, the coordination between users that may mitigate 
these costs is difficult to achieve.  Wi-Fi radio users, particularly those who attempt outdoor 
deployments, are advised to seek out other Wi-Fi users and gain their cooperation, using different 
channels and placing facilities in complementary locations.
220   Indeed, WISPs may find themselves 
in “broadcast wars,” where transmissions to occupy Wi-Fi channels, along with the use of higher 
power levels, are strategic tools used to lower rivals’ quality of service.
221   Degraded performance is 
only the tip of the iceberg; networks never deployed due to the costs of coordination in this space 
constitute the largest losses.  The tragedy of the commons is generally the unobserved counter-
factual. 
B.  Physics and Architecture 
Radio waves are real things transmitted with real energy.
222  Potential conflicts depend on the 
separation, if any, between the band being used by the interfering transmitter, and the band that the 
unwitting receiver is trying to receive.  It depends on the power of the rival transmitter, its proximity, 
and on directional antennas mounted (or not mounted) on the transmitter, the unwitting receiver, or 
both.   
The interference problem is defined by the aggregate of all competing transmitters, which is 
to say, by the transmission frequencies, power, proximity, and antenna configurations of all 
intentional, incidental, and unintentional interfering transmitters in the band, and all the buildings, 
foliage, fog, meteor trails, and extraterrestrial radiation belts, that may reflect their signals (usually 
aggravating the problem) or attenuate them (usually mitigating it).  A spectrum licensee with liberal 
property rights uniquely possesses the information, economic incentive, and financial ability to 
optimize the architecture to make the best possible use of such a complex, turbulent resource. 
                                                 
219 Hewlett-Packard, WiFi and Bluetooth – Interference Issues at 1 (Jan. 2002), 
http://www.hp.com/rnd/library/pdf/WiFi_Bluetooth_coexistance.pdf.   
220   Tim Pozar, Regulations Affecting 802.11 Deployments, Version 1.5 (March 10, 2004) (“Pozar, Regulations Affecting 
802.11”); http://www.lns.com/papers/part15/Regulations_Affecting_802_11.pdf. 
221 Christian Sandvig, Return of the Broadcast War, paper delivered to the Telecommunications Policy Research 
Conference (Sept. 2005) at 23; http://www.communication.illinois.edu/csandvig/research/Broadcast_War.pdf (quoting 
one WISP operator as saying, “The more channels I grab means the less competition”).  
222 Although the concepts are often used interchangeably, it is here important to distinguish between “spectrum,” which 
itself is not a thing, and the radio waves or signals that are transmitted through space.  See Howard A. Shelanski and Peter 
W. Huber, Administrative Creation of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum, 41 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 581 
(Oct., 1998), at 584 (“There is no such thing as ‘spectrum’ out there, any more so than there was ‘ether,’ to be bottled by 
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resulting from the transmission of radio waves within defined frequency bands. Draft 
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As Ronald Coase noted decades ago, the appropriate quest is not to eliminate interference 
between wireless users, which is overly protective, but to achieve just the proper amount.
223  How 
much interference is tolerable can never be defined by the interfering transmitter – it must, self-
evidently, be defined by the receiver.  Firefighters groping their way through an inferno tolerate less 
interference than teenagers text-messaging at the mall.  “Tolerable” itself is inevitably defined in 
statistical terms: how often will noise levels rise high enough to block a transmission, and what 
blocking probability is acceptable? 
The argument that radio waves do not interfere, that spectrum is not scarce, implies that the 
only quality of service issue lies in the design of the individual receiver.  A race for better radios then 
becomes the alternative to network coordination.
224  When interference is explained as a problem of 
insufficient processing power in the radio receiver, individual users are portrayed as efficiently 
pursuing – with help from equipment vendors, who profit from selling better radios – the optimal 
level of reception (the reciprocal of interference).   
This mischaracterizes the economic problem, which centers on how to entice all productive 
contributions where benefits exceed costs.  Whatever the incentive of an individual to buy a radio that 
punches through the din, and the vendor to profit from selling that device, the resulting transactions 
will not take account of the costs transmissions impose on other users.  This loads all the interference 
mitigation on the individual user’s radio and government rules (such as power limits), with decisions 
taken in isolation from the other source of the conflict. While mobile carriers, as spectrum owners, 
aggressively deploy systems that make radios quieter and spillovers smaller, users predictably pollute 
the airwaves by blasting signals at higher power than necessary so as to guarantee safe passage for 
their communications.
225  In short, each user competes to claim control over airspace, insensitive to 
the costs imposed on others.  This is standard tragedy of the commons,
226 and there is considerable 
                                                 
223   See infra, at note __. 
224   Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications; Werbach, Radio Revolution at 37. 
225   Radio engineers who work with Wi-Fi commonly acknowledge costs of non-exclusivity.  Using 5.8 GHz frequencies 
to bring broadband connections to a housing development in a low-income part of San Francisco, Tim Pozar notes that 
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(April 4, 2008) at slide 26; http://www.iep.gmu.edu/documents/GMU-Pozar-20080404.pdf.  See also, Pozar, Regulations 
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addressed if spectrum is to be used efficiently.  The alternative is to allocate excessive spectrum so that contention is 
rare.”  Jon M. Peha, Wireless Communications and Coexistence for Smart Environments, IEEE  PERSONAL 
COMMUNICATIONS (Oct. 2000). 
226  See Jon M. Peha, Emerging Technology and Spectrum Policy Reform, International Telecommunications Union 
Workshop on Market Mechanisms for Spectrum Mangagement (Geneva, Switzerland; Jan. 2007); 
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/stn/spectrum/workshop_proceedings/Background_Papers_Final/Jon%20Peha%20ITU%20spec
trum%20workshop.pdf., at 5 (footnote omitted). (“When releasing unlicensed spectrum, regulators must guard against two 
related sources of inefficiency. One is that unlicensed spectrum will attract applications that would operate more Draft 
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concern among engineers concerning how to deter it in unlicensed bands.
227  This inevitably involves 
some level of enhanced coordination, public or private.
228 
The contrast with liberal licensed bands could not be sharper.  Private spectrum owners will 
internalize the cost of spillovers – emissions that conflict with rival wireless users -- and invest 
heavily to reduce them.  Such entities have a readily available efficiency metric to guide this calculus: 
undertake only those interference-reducing outlays where expected benefits exceed expected costs.   
To be rude and to chew up bandwidth on such networks is to pay extra.  Pricing schedules 
steer subscribers towards reducing costly interference, charging higher rates (or, equivalently, limited 
bucket minutes) for peak time calls.  But network efforts to conserve spectrum go much further. 
Dynamic power control features in cell-phones provides one example of how private networks seek 
to reduce emissions, making their exclusively controlled bandwidth quieter, expanding valuable 
opportunities.  Courteous protocols, often put forth as a way to share unlicensed spectrum,
229 are 
actually hardwired into mobile handsets accessing licensed spectrum. Thus, handsets are developed 
and programmed to be polite emitters, and manufacturers -- to sell to carriers, or be certified to access 
their spectrum in sales directly to end users -- continually press to increase performance at lower 
power levels, reducing demands on shared frequencies.  As Charles Jackson writes, “handsets are part 
of the network,”
230 and carriers are careful to protect their spectrum by promoting (and often 
subsidizing) radios that behave in friendly fashion.   
C.  Smart Radios, Dumb Crowds 
As noted, interference is determined by the total electromagnetic din created by the sum total 
of all the radios trying to transmit in a band, together with other incidental and inadvertent sources of 
noise.  In the total-din calculus, the number of radios is important, as is their power.  But no one 
directly controls the total number of transmitters in an unlicensed band.  
End users compound the problem when they hang on to obsolete transmitters long after more 
spectrum-efficient technologies have been developed.  Countless radios that rank as “low-power” and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
effectively and efficiently in licensed spectrum. The other is that engineers will design “greedy” devices, i.e. those that 
transmit with greater power, duration, or bandwidth than necessary, because they have little incentive to conserve 
spectrum that is shared. In the extreme, greedy devices can lead to a tragedy of the commons, where many devices are 
greedy, and all devices in the band experience inadequate performance as a result.”).   
227 Hyun Jin Kim and Jon M. Peha, Detecting Selfish Behavior in a Cooperative Commons, IEEE DySpan (2008); 
http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~peha/detecting_selfish.pdf.  
228   Ad hoc mesh networks that create “cooperation gain” in unlicensed bands are touted as mechanisms for expanding 
the capacity of radios using non-exclusive spectrum rights.  But the costs of organizing such solutions are relatively high, 
which is why the model has yet to be embraced in any appreciable volume.  Indeed, the need for network coordination is 
itself hampered by the lack of spectrum ownership.  This is why Jon Peha recommends licensed spectrum to affect the ad 
hoc mesh solution:  “[A] ‘spectrum commons’ could be created by a license-holder instead of the regulator. Rather than 
using unlicensed spectrum, a private entity might obtain a license, establish its own operating rules, and allow devices to 
operate in its spectrum. The latter approach is particularly appropriate for a cooperative system…” such as ad hoc meshes.  
Peha Emerging Technology and Spectrum Reform at 7. 
229  Lawrence Lessig, Code And Other Laws of Cyberspace 184 (1999).   
230  Charles L. Jackson, Wireless Handsets Are Part of  the Network, ITS 2006 Biennial  Conference (June 2006); 
www.its2006bupt.org.   Draft 
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“smart” today may still be transmitting with impunity in unlicensed bands ten years hence, occupying 
spectrum that could be used much more efficiently by much smarter, lower-power technology 
developed in the interim.  Arguments for more unlicensed bandwidth assert that competition between 
technology suppliers will produce devices that effectively limit interference.  This fails to engage the 
central problem posed by unlicensed wireless users whose economic interest is to keep operating their 
old radios no matter the spillovers they cause. 
Exclusive airwave rights help address both problems.  The licensee controls the total number 
of transmitters (base stations, handsets, M2M radios,
231 and so forth).  It can (and does) hardwire 
cooperation into such devices, promoting spectrum-saving devices.  It also orchestrates orderly 
transitions from old technology to new.  The cellular networks of the early 1980s, for example, were 
analog by FCC mandate.  After the FCC authorized digital upgrades, carriers effected a seamless 
transition, in part by giving their customers new, less polluting, subsidized phones.
232 
Wi-Fi standards, commons advocates claim, have dealt with the problem of “orphan” 
technology much better than broadcasters have managed to make the transition from analog to digital 
television.
233  This evinces the confusion discussed earlier over the distinction between traditional 
licenses and liberal licenses.  The TV market is plagued by coordination problems precisely because 
TV broadcasters do not own their spectrum, cannot transact to rearrange it, and cannot control the 
radio receivers using it.  TV sets are, in other words, unlicensed.  These receivers are made to 
government specifications, and the program content they access is supplied via traditional licenses.   
In the cellular market, with its liberal licenses, networks control their airspace and manage the 
subscriber interface: the leaps in technology – from the flip phones of just five years ago to the 
iPhones and broadband datacards of today – are large and continuous.  No one seems much 
concerned about the “digital cellular transition” or the “EV DO transition,” despite the fact that the 
economic consequences for actual consumers are far more profound, remembering that over 90% of 
TV viewing takes place via cable and satellite, unaffected by the digital TV transition – completed in 
2009, and officially twenty-two years in the making.
234 
Perhaps the most popular metaphor for the view that smart radios obviate the utility of a 
controlled spectrum space is the cocktail party tale.  The party venue may fill up, and the din of the 
crowd increases to a dull roar.  But the human ear is adroit at focusing on just one conversation in the 
mix.  Sometimes so adroit that one can eavesdrop on particularly juicy chatter being conducted 
                                                 
231   Machine to machine wireless devices are a burgeoning part of the mobile network landscape.  See Mayo & Wallsten, 
The Role of Secondary Markets. 
232  The providers had an economic incentive to retain existing customers.  For the rules governing the transition, see Year 
2000 Biennial Regulatory Review – Amendment of Part 22 of the Commission’s Rules To Modify or Eliminate Outdated 
Rules Affecting the Cellular Radiotelephone Service and Other Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 16 FCC Rcd 11169, ¶¶ 18-20 (2001). 
233  Werbach, Radio Revolution at 23-24.   
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halfway across the room.
235  The moral of the tale is that good receivers can beat a noisy roar.  And 
science has today given us just the technologies to make those good receivers. 
The cocktail party metaphor in fact popped up long ago in the classroom of Claude Shannon, 
author of Shannon’s Law and a towering figure in modern radio frequency engineering.
236  His 
version inspired his M.I.T. student, Irwin Jacobs, to implement the insight.  Jacobs, with fellow 
scientist Andrew Viterbi, developed the “spread spectrum” technology that unraveled so many 
garbled sounds into intelligible conversations, and then applied that technology to mass 
communications.  The company they founded, Qualcomm, pioneered advanced wireless networks 
based not on unlicensed, but licensed, spectrum.
237  Hence, even the iconic spectrum-sharing 
technological twist is nested in a globally successful application using exclusive spectrum rights 
which, among other things, allowed spread spectrum methods to work by limiting the number of 
conversations and the overall level of noise – necessary for successful communications even with the 
most advanced science.
238 
D.  Physical Separation 
When an antenna transmits equally in all directions, the power of the signal falls with the 
square of the distance.  Obstacles – buildings, trees, and the air itself – cause additional attenuation.  
The earth’s curvature blocks signals from transmitters situated over the horizon.  But here too, 
physical separation involves trade-offs and judgment calls based on the cost and quality of the 
transmitters and receivers.  The ability to squeeze more radios within a given space is at the heart of 
advanced communications.  “Father of the Cellphone” Martin Cooper estimates that it accounts for 
the lion’s share of a one million-fold increase in spectrum capacity every fifty years, a relationship 
now known as Cooper’s Law.
239 
With broadcasting, the FCC’s historical policy was wide physical spacing to accommodate 
cheap receivers.
240  This approach devoted most channels to “taboo” fillers, guard bands left idle to 
                                                 
235  See On the Same Wavelength, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 14, 2004) (“A well-attended cocktail party has a din of many 
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239   Martin Cooper, Antennas Get Smart, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN  (July 2003). 
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absorb stray interference.  As technology improved, the Commission – with long lags -- has required 
less spacing.
241  The stultification associated with rigid administrative controls is evident.  In 1952, 
four national commercial TV networks existed – ABC, CBS, DuMont and NBC.  This set defined the 
scope of America’s programming choice.  By 1984, that number had sunk to three.  The elimination 
of rules blocking cable and satellite TV competition then permitted the number of national and local 
broadcast networks to skyrocket.
242  But for a generation, regulation put a stranglehold on 
competitive progress. 
The administrative approach to spectrum resulted in massive under-utilization of radio,
243 
television,
244 and other allocated bands.
245  What appeared to be a cheap way to assure high-quality 
reception, turned out to be anything but.  The opportunity costs – what valuable wireless stuff could 
have used the taboo channels – have easily dominated any improvement in off-air viewing they 
provide. 
With flexible-use licenses for mobile services, the Commission has abandoned “site 
licensing” for “geographic licensing.”  The new approach delegates physical-spacing decisions to 
wireless operators.  The core engineering concept behind “cellular” phone service is that the same 
frequencies can be reused again and again when the arrays of potentially conflicting transmitters are 
suitably deployed.  Wireless carriers are in charge of making these architectural calls.  They generally 
add new cells as they add new subscribers.  Wireless carriers thus control the spacing of their 
customers.
246  Neither the FCC nor the licensees can easily control the location of the peripatetic 
                                                                                                                                                                     
stations up to 15 channels apart. . . . Because the new digital TV system is more spectrally efficient, fewer channels will 
be needed after the transition to accommodate all existing television stations.”
 ); J. Walker, Don’t Touch That Dial:  Free 
Radio Berkeley Takes on the FCC and Official History, REASON at 30 (Oct. 1995) (quoting Fred Crock, engineering 
supervisor at San Francisco radio station KQED:  “[T]he broadcast allocations in this country are based on allowing the 
use of inexpensive receivers by the general public.  What appears to be a hole in the FM broadcast band may be there to 
accommodate the shortcomings of inexpensive receiver design.  It would be possible to put more stations onto the 
broadcast band, but that would require the use of more expensive, more sophisticated radios by the public.”) See also 
Media Access Project, Digital Television and Spectrum Allocation, 
http://www.mediaaccess.org/programs/digitaltv/6069.htm (“Because analog transmission signals can interfere with each 
other, TV stations have traditionally been separated in their positions on the dial.  For example, a station that is assigned 
to channel 3 cannot be in the same geographic region as another channel 3, or even a channel 2 or 4.  But digital 
transmission will suffer less interference, and will allow channels 2, 3, and 4 to exist in the same region.  The spectrum 
allocated to TV broadcasting could be ‘packed’ into a smaller range of frequencies.”). 
241 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.610(b), 73.623(d) (on average, the minimum separation distance for the same channel in 
neighboring regions is significantly less for DTV compared to typical analog signals).  
242   See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., and John M. Vernon, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 
Fourth Edition (2005), 480-81. 
243   Thomas W. Hazlett & Bruno Viani, Legislators vs. Regulators: Who Killed Low Power FM Radio? 7 BUSINESS & 
POLITICS (April 2005). 
244  Thomas W. Hazlett, The U.S. Digital TV Transition: Time to Toss the Negroponte Switch, AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
for Regulatory Studies No. 01-15. 
245   Thomas W. Hazlett, Optimal Abolition of FCC Spectrum Allocation, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (Winter 2008). 
246 See 47 C.F.R. § 22.907 (“Licensees in the Cellular Radiotelephone Service must coordinate, with the appropriate 
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C.F.R. § 24.134 (“A co-channel separation distance is not required for the base stations of the same licensee or when the 
affected parties have agreed to other co-channel separation distances.”). Draft 
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transmitters in cell phones, PDAs, and netbooks, so carriers follow their customers, building out 
facilities, splitting cells to increase capacity, executing roaming agreements for seamless “out of 
market” service, and pricing calls to limit crowding.
247   
Recently, carriers have followed their customers all the way to their homes, offering to better 
extend the reach of their WANs.  T-Mobile offers a device that routes in-home calls to broadband 
modems (connected to DSL or cable data networks) for VoIP connections using Wi-Fi links, with 
calls flipping over to mobile networks when the subscriber hops in her car and drives off.
248  
Alternatively, Verizon and Sprint supply subscribers with femtocells, miniature base stations that 
extend “four bars” to the individual subscriber’s home.
249  These transceivers utilize the carrier’s 
licensed frequencies within the home, but then route outgoing traffic via (fixed) broadband links.
250 
Advanced wireless technologies are alleged to end the role of geographical separation in 
network planning to an end.  Radios in close proximity are now easily coordinated by smart 
technologies that use simple etiquettes to coordinate emissions.  Mesh networks use Wi-Fi radios as 
links in a chain over which they hop across the Internet, creating capacity with the additional user.  
Instead of limiting capacity, the more the merrier: extra radios will mean more coverage, and more 
total wireless capacity, too.
251  Where scarcity and conflicts once reigned, abundance now flowers.
252 
  But wireless meshes, which have been available for over a quarter century,
253 are no free radio 
spectrum lunch.  Costs of coordinating the mesh are substantial.  So high, relative to the alternatives, 
that ad hoc meshes are virtually non-existent.  Some agencies, including the U.S. military, do use 
mesh networks, but these are engineered top-down, not spontaneously, and the network providers that 
create such systems could purchase spectrum inputs just as mobile carriers do.  Indeed, mesh 
                                                 
247 There is no irony in the fact that most customer minutes are “free,” in the sense of being off-peak, on-net, or within the 
allotted “bucket.”  So long as network “members” support the jointly shared facilities (including spectrum) with monthly 
subscription fees, the carrier enthusiastically extends access rights (which, of course, is why subscribers join).  Metering 
peak minutes that run past the bucket limits congestion.   
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The End of Spectrum Scarcity, IEEE Spectrum (March 2004); http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/mar04/3811. 
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networks are built using licensed spectrum.
254   The promise of meshes as disruptive innovations was 
that they would eliminate the network coordination function altogether.
255  That promise has not been 
realized.
256  ArrayComm, a wireless technology firm pioneering the development of “smart 
antennas,” offers a general explanation:  
 
The final and most confused argument against concerns about spectrum availability 
rests on the belief that “technology” will solve the problem by enabling through 
cognitive radios and other concepts the peaceful cohabitation of spectrum by formerly 
interfering applications. While there are large tracts of allocated but currently 
underutilized spectrum in the mobile-device sweet spot, especially for public safety 
and military applications, and while it is true in principle that continuing advances in 
signal processing technologies will eventually make the collaborating-radios vision 
feasible, the predominant view is that the long timeline for its realization does not 
make this argument relevant for current business planning purposes. In the meantime, 




  Tellingly, what has been deployed are network-centric meshes, where a carrier distributes 
devices across an area, hard-wires them to coordinate their use, and then links them to a broadband 
connection (over privately owned spectrum) to the Internet.  This mimics the structural model of the 
cellular operator.    
 
One difference, of course, is found in performance.  Whereas mesh networks are designed for 
limited applications and have great difficulty handling mobile communications, cellular networks 
provide ubiquitous mobile coverage and scale to handle billions of minutes of use.  The market test 
has been run.  Were wireless meshes to render spectrum scarcity moot, the unlicensed bands would 
have displaced the cellular bands and the $150 billion per year mobile industry would have been 
displaced by mesh carriers using “free” airwaves.   
 
E.  Technology and Innovation 
When it liberally licenses spectrum, the FCC largely deregulates the hardware.  When it un-
licenses spectrum, the FCC necessarily regulates the hardware. 
                                                 
254   The 4.9 MHz band, allocated for licensed use by public safety organizations, hosts significant mesh deployments.  
Interference and Metro-Scale Wi-Fi Mesh Networks, Farpoint Group Technical Note at 4 (Jan. 2008); http://www.ict-
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In the CMRS bands, where spectrum is licensed for flexible use, the licensee has wide 
discretion to decide what mix of low-power and high-power radios to deploy, selecting a mix to 
maximize profits.  When spectrum is unlicensed, the regulator must – and does – regulate radio 
hardware power and standards.
258  “Low-power,” “smart,” and “non-interfering threshold” aren’t 
technical terms, but regulatory constructs. 
Thus, however smart they may be, all “intentional radiators” are regulated under Part 15, 
Subpart C, of the FCC rules, the first section of which establishes an “equipment authorization 
requirement.”  This Subpart goes on to regulate antennas, power amplifiers, and bands of operation, 
and then sets out detailed “radiated emission” limits, band by band.
259  The radios used in licensed 
bands require FCC approval, too.  But Part 15 regulation of devices that operate in unlicensed bands 
is much more intrusive because it strictly regulates power, one of the two most important technical 
characteristics (alongside operating frequency) of every radio.   
There is no law of engineering that says everyone will always be better served by low-power, 
short-range radios.  By transmitting from 23,000 miles in space to cover half the continent, direct 
broadcast satellites deliver competitive digital television signals to over one hundred million 
households, including those in rural communities that have no prospect of getting comparable video 
service from unlicensed wireless devices any time soon.  Mobile carriers built out their networks 
efficiently by starting with fewer, larger, higher-power cell sites; more cell sites and lower power 
radios followed in step with growth in subscribers and minutes of use.  Here too, the economical roll-
out of service in rural areas has often depended on using taller masts and higher-power transmitters to 
provide large service footprints across thinly populated areas.  Where people are sparse, simpler, 
cheaper radios that “waste” spectrum are more efficient, because there’s spectrum to spare.
260 
These are exactly the tradeoffs that liberal license holders routinely discover and efficiently 
exploit.  The FCC’s settled policy is now to give licensees “flexibility to determine the types of 
services and the technologies and technical implementation designs used to provide those 
services.”
261  Technology choices have thus emerged as a key dimension of competition among 
service providers.  
Because about half of all transmissions originate in the hands of end users, wireless carriers 
have also invested heavily to get high-performance, feature-rich, spectrum-efficient wireless devices 
into their customers’ hands.
262  Carriers paid about three-quarters of the approximately $13 billion 
spent on mobile phones in the U.S. in 2003.
263  Such subsidies reflect carriers’ propertied interest in 
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their spectrum.  Newer phones embed more advanced technologies, reducing spectrum spillovers 
(interference) and offering greater functionality for users.  Both are of value to the network over and 
above the gains delivered to the individual adopter.  Hence, handset subsidies are higher for newer 
models, and have been particularly important in spreading 3G technology.
264  Subsidies are more 
aggressively supplied by smaller networks, underscoring the competitive role of such vertical 
promotions.
265 
Unlicensed bands accommodate non-exclusive use rights, but require highly exclusionary 
public policies.  The technologies authorized in unlicensed bands effectively prohibit most wireless 
options, on the expectation that they would cause harmful interference.  When the FCC un-licenses 
spectrum, carriers and consumers must choose Intel’s Centrino chips over Qualcomm’s CDMA chips 
and Wi-Fi access points over data networks provided by GSM UMTS/HSDPA, CDMA 1xEV-DV, or 
WiMAX optimized for licensed radio spectrum.
266   
The fact that the approved low-power technology choices sometimes result in widespread 
adoption is evidence that not all social value is eliminated by the allocation policy.  It does not, 
however, prove that the resulting wireless activity is the optimum outcome.  A government-managed 
band does not contain the requisite feedback mechanisms to reveal and then adjust to the most 
efficient spectrum sharing arrangements.  It is always possible that an alternative set of rules would 
generate greater gains.  But whereas owners of licensed spectrum have profit incentives and the 
financial ability (i.e., access to capital markets) to arrange positive-sum transactions to make such 
transitions as present themselves as good candidates for superior results, spectrum regulators do not. 
Some unlicensed bands appear have performed well, like the 900 MHz and 2.4 GHz bands, 
while others, like U-PCS and the 3650 MHz band, appear to constitute allocation failures.  But 
regulators have no reliable way to optimize any particular band because the relevant counter-factual 
obviously cannot be observed beforehand.  More basically, even after the fact – when the FCC 
observes “tremendous success” or some other categorically salubrious outcome – it has not made the 
relevant social welfare evaluation: was the FCC’s allocation, and the associated rules (including 
adoption of the unlicensed access model and the restrictions on radio usage attendant to that 
approach) the most efficient way to use this particular bandwidth?  Could markets have supplied 
more creative, lower-cost ways to accommodate the services obtained, while stimulating additional 
wireless services of value to consumers?   That the FCC does not have the institutional ability to 
make such judgments with the reliability of alternative institutions, notably profit-maximizing capital 
owners in competitive markets, is obvious on numerous levels.  Perhaps most striking is that the FCC 
does not even, as a pro forma matter, deem it necessary to ask the question.    
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The types of evidence needed to make such evaluations are market data generally unavailable 
to public sector regulators, government employees who do not generate information as to profitable 
opportunities for spectrum re-use but, rather, maximize utility under the political constraints 
governing their agency.  Whereas entrepreneurs scour the marketplace looking for assets that are 
undervalued, searching for the financial means to divert such resources to more productive 
employments, the bureaucratic goal is to placate an existing governing equilibrium. 
It is likewise unknowable within an administrative allocation system whether a given 
unlicensed block – even where it is certifiably creating more benefit than cost in aggregate – is of the 
right size.  Perhaps the 2.4 GHz ISM band would optimally be half, or twice, its present scope.  
Without ownership, there are no transactions; without transactions no market values.  This leaves 
regulators guessing about where to draw lines.  Whereas New York City understands what the cost of 
an acre is, and can judge whether it is worth purchasing more land to add to Central Park (or subtract 
by a sale), the value of a license-free bandwidth allocation is a matter of mere conjecture. 
Suppose that a firm like Apple, instead of arguing for the government to allocate more 
bandwidth to license-exempt use, were to buy liberal licenses and then provide a “spectrum 
commons” on its own.
267  It could then set frequency sharing rules, including technology formats and 
power limits, becoming a private FCC.  In fact, this is the vertical structure of the mobile carrier 
space that already exists, the twist being a business model that rides by contract on the carrier’s 
network infrastructure and yet “opens” the licensed airwaves to radio devices and applications 
provided by hundreds of third party providers.    
Under this approach, competitive market forces regulate the performance of Apple in 
providing the “commons.”  Just as carriers are rewarded for providing customers with superior user 
experiences, the “unlicensed” space would become profitable to the degree that sharing rules were 
properly balanced, generating value-added via useful applications.  Not only is such a model already 
well established, if not ubiquitous, in the licensing of intellectual property rights,
268 it mirrors the 
system in place for mobile carriers.  There, device makers contract to gain access to carriers’ 
networks and spectrum assets, passing the rights to customers who “play” their radios right out of the 
box.  Mobile handsets, including those like TracFone (a virtual mobile operator that enables wireless 
phone calls using access rights purchased in wholesale markets) or Kindle (a book reader, sold by 
Amazon, that downloads content via Amazon’s contract with Sprint) embed seamless spectrum 
access rights for end users.  
The advantages of such an approach over administrative allocation are manifest.  But such an 
outcome is displaced by mandated allocations to unlicensed allocations.  Hence, public policy drives 
Apple to request that the government place spectrum resources at risk, and then relies on its lobbyists 
to steer those rules in the direction sought by the firm.  Whatever Apple has gained from unlicensed 
allocation, it obliterates transparency, undermines productive efficiencies, and blocks information-
rich feedback loops.  And, it should be noted, that Apple has emerged as a powerhouse in the wireless 
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X.  POLICY 
Administrative allocation of radio spectrum has historically been plagued by overly 
conservative policies that unduly limited competition and blocked technological innovation.   But as 
broadcasting was eclipsed by mobile telephony, a subtle shift in policy took hold that in hindsight 
amounted to a policy revolution.  In the modern marketplace, liberal spectrum licenses host extremely 
complex economic structures, allowing millions of customers to buy wireless services using advanced 
technologies, while facing a continually increasing number of access options and applications.  This 
regime generates intense sharing of spectrum by rival networks and by mass-market subscribers to 
voice and data services.  In delegating choices to competitive firms, de facto spectrum ownership 
rationalizes spectrum use.   
  The suggestion that exclusive rights to radio spectrum are made obsolete by advancing 
technology has the basic economic coordination problem backwards.  The advanced wireless devices 
are today superior, in their ability to send and receive data, to previous generations.  But they cannot 
be fruitfully deployed without some form of social control over the airwaves they access.  The 
alternative to competitive ownership is the imposition of behavioral constraints by regulators.  Power 
limits and technology restrictions are inevitably applied to license-exempt spectrum to limit conflicts.  
Smart radios do not portend the “end of scarcity” but constitute yet another ascending pathway on the 
mountain wireless entrepreneurs have been climbing since Marconi triggered the race for wireless 
innovations in 1895. 
  That seminal technological breakthrough triggered a chain of events that created spectrum 
scarcity.  Contrary to the view that advanced devices solve such mundane matters of economic 
organization and obviate the value of exclusive spectrum rights, each new and improved radio 
actually triggers more demand for airwave access, increasing potential spectrum conflicts.   
Intensifying calls for more unlicensed spectrum in more desirable bands reflects just this scarcity, 
with rival claims made in the political marketplace.  The pro-consumer policy unleashing the social 
value of wireless would shift such competitive bidding from the political marketplace to the 
economic realm. 
This approach carries great promise and little risk.  There is nothing that “spectrum 
inventories” held by government can achieve.  The most reliable way to destroy valuable spectrum, in 
fact, is not to use it.  The second most reliable way is to distribute a massive number of tiny, 
overlapping rights that cannot be usefully re-aggregated; the Humpty Dumpty approach that can 
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easily result from unlicensed allocations.
270  By allocating liberal licenses to competitors, however, 
market forces will divert spectrum resources to where demands are highest.  If regulators in the future 
ascertain that important demands are going, in fact, unmet, it will be free to acquire frequencies for 
the task and to know the market price of doing so.   
The 700 MHz licenses auctioned in March 2008 raised $19 billion for the U.S. Treasury.  
Those bids reflect future anticipated profits (now transferred to the government) available to firms 
that control the resource rights conveyed.   Nothing prevented bidders from purchasing such 
bandwidth and deploying it as a “spectrum commons”; indeed, that approach would seem an 
attractive alternative to spending the many billions of dollars on network infrastructure required in 
executing the mobile carriers’ network-centric model – were customers willing to pay for the services 
therein offered.  
Marketplace rejection of the “commons” model does not constitute market failure, but a 
competitive equilibrium.  It reveals that there are superior choices, given the available technologies 
and the associated consumer demands, for using valuable radio frequencies. That is the rationality 
supplied by liberal spectrum licenses. 
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